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BEYOND INDIGENOUS PROPERTY RIGHTS:
EXPLORING THE EMERGENCE OF A
DISTINCTIVE CONNECTION DOCTRINE
ERIC DANNENMAIER∗
Human rights law has begun to offer normative protection for what
remains of indigenous lands. Yet territory now better defended from
conquest and encroachment is increasingly threatened by their
byproducts. Water scarcity, food security, waste deposition, climate
change—in short, the multiple impacts of industrial development—pose a
new territorial challenge to indigenous communities that will test the
reach and capacity of the human rights regime.
This Article examines that challenge and argues that a solution may lie
in emerging human rights doctrine recognizing indigenous peoples’ land
rights not as heirs to a European conception of property, but as peoples
with a distinctive historical, cultural, and spiritual relationship to the land
and environment. The Article does not purport to create this doctrine, but
merely to name it and examine its contours. The author traces multiple
sources of law that affirm indigenous property rights based on landconnectedness and proposes, for the sake of analysis, a “distinctive
connection” doctrine. The article asks:
1. How has this doctrine been defined and applied in indigenous
property claims based, in part, on cultural and spiritual landrelationships; and
2. Can it be effectively deployed to protect against the “new”
territorial encroachment: the impact on indigenous communities’
environment?
While a distinctive connection has been repeatedly advanced, its
contours remain uncertain and it has not been fully deployed to address
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natural resource and ecological concerns of indigenous peoples. The
author thus offers an analytic framework within which the connection
might be further understood, emphasizing its relevance to the
environment. The article looks at examples of recent indigenous
environmental cases—an Inuit climate change claim, Western Shoshone
concerns regarding mining practices and nuclear waste disposal on
traditional lands, and remedial rights of Inuit communities affected by the
Exxon Valdez oil spill—to suggest that a distinctive connection doctrine
may offer a means of addressing environmental impacts bound up with
indigenous communities’ relationship to the land and environment. The
author argues this doctrine may thus give rise to a property right beyond
title and trespass: one that protects the deeper ecological values of this
distinctive connection.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article looks at the evolution of indigenous peoples’ land rights
under international human rights law and examines the claim—of
instruments, tribunals, scholars, institutions, and indigenous advocates—
that indigenous peoples have a unique or distinctive connection to the land
with deep social, cultural, and spiritual meaning. The claim is not casual or
incidental but rather integral to the increasing assertion and recognition of
indigenous land rights at many levels.
The claim of uniqueness, which the author posits as an emerging
“distinctive connection doctrine,” draws on social and cultural human
rights principles, and has helped both to justify indigenous land rights and
to shape the nature of those rights beyond traditional domestic title and
tenure. While indigenous sovereignty is often seen as lost long ago, or at
least highly eroded, the distinctive connection has allowed indigenous
peoples to lay collective claim to possessory property rights in the absence
of a sovereign prerogative.
The Article explores this emerging doctrine, examining the claim of
uniqueness and asking what its legal significance has been in the evolution
of indigenous land rights. The author goes further to ask whether the
doctrine might be deployed more effectively where the unique attributes of
indigenous peoples are particularly relevant to ecological concerns and
environmental rights. This latter possibility is explored with reference to
environmental litigation, where the cultural and spiritual concerns of
indigenous peoples make them particularly vulnerable to environmental
harms.
Part II provides background on the evolution of indigenous land rights
in international law. It begins by discussing how the term “indigenous”
has come to be constructed in international law and describing how
indigenous property and sovereignty were eroded during the period of
European colonial expansion. This Part then outlines the emergence of
instruments that have allowed indigenous peoples to reclaim some of their
lost property rights in the context of human rights law.
Part III explores these human rights instruments in much greater detail
to better elucidate how the distinctive relationship has been described and
asserted in legal and institutional contexts. This is a thick descriptive piece
that offers some analytical insights, but is intended primarily to highlight
the claim of a unique connection.
Part IV examines how the assertion of a distinctive relationship has
affected the outcome of cases dealing with indigenous land and resource
rights. This is also a descriptive piece focusing on cases that have
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employed a distinctive connection doctrine, though without naming it as
such and without fully examining its implications. Many tribunals assert
the connection yet fall back on traditional property rights to provide relief
not unique to indigenous concerns. While collective property claims have
thus been advanced, tribunals often have not addressed (because they have
not perceived a need) the deeper implications of rights associated with the
spiritual and cultural connection of indigenous communities to the land
and environment.
Part V considers the work that a distinctive connection seems to be
doing in the instruments and cases discussed in Parts III and IV—offering
an analytical framework within which the doctrine might be better
understood. It also asks how the doctrinal recognition of this distinctive
relationship might be more fully developed to protect the complex
interests of indigenous communities relating to the environment. It looks
at three recent cases where a distinctive connection may be especially
relevant—an Inuit Circumpolar Conference claim concerning climate
change, Western Shoshone concerns regarding mining practices and a
nuclear waste repository on their traditional lands, and remedial rights of
Inuit communities affected by the Exxon Valdez oil spill—to suggest that
the distinctive connection doctrine may have particular relevance where
concerns over environmental impact are bound up with a communities’
historical, cultural, and spiritual relationship to the land and environment.
The author concludes that a distinctive connection doctrine, while
already serving (though innominately) to solidify the still-tenuous
collective property claims of indigenous peoples, could be deployed in
service of rights beyond title and trespass. Peoples with a unique
relationship to the land and natural environment—a relationship tied to
culture and spiritual tradition as well as livelihood—should be able to call
upon human rights protection to preserve that relationship; otherwise
human rights guarantees of economic, social, and cultural protection have
little meaning for these peoples. The result of this acknowledgement is not
radical, but calls (as economic, social, and cultural claims do) on
governments to work toward progressive realization of rights. This means
at least beginning to focus on environmental impacts on indigenous
communities and to give those affected standing to defend cultural and
spiritual values. Finally, the author acknowledges, but leaves for future
exploration, the implications the doctrine may have for communities
similarly situated—with deeply rooted relationships to the land—but not
similarly understood as indigenous.
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II. THE EVOLVING UNDERSTANDING OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS
The rights of indigenous peoples in international law changed rapidly
and substantially during the latter half of the twentieth century, and land
claims were often at the forefront of these changes. Initially, from almost
the moment that indigenous peoples were formally encountered by
European states (a moment that, in itself, helps define the word
“indigenous”),1 legal norms were constructed to deny indigenous peoples
essentially all sovereignty over the land and resources they traditionally
occupied and used.2 Indeed, ideas about indigenous sovereignty were often
co-constructed with norms that denied legal personhood—even
humanity—to indigenous peoples themselves; these constructs were in
many ways mutually reinforcing. These ideas about indigenous land rights
(and about indigenous peoples more generally) began to change
dramatically following World War II, as the advent of international human
rights law caused a reexamination of the concerns, status, and treatment of
an estimated 200 million indigenous people.3
The most recent statement of international law regarding indigenous
peoples, the September 2007 U.N. Declaration on Indigenous Rights,
acknowledges that indigenous peoples have, among other rights: the “right
to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights

1. See discussion infra Part II.A.
2. I refer to a “formal encounter” meaning the encounter with Europeans making territorial
claims. This includes, for example, Portuguese voyages along the African coast in the mid-fifteenth
century; the voyage of Columbus to the Americas in 1492; and the voyage of Vasco de Gama around
the coast of Africa to India in 1497–98. There is strong evidence that Europeans encountered the
inhabitants of the Americas much earlier than Columbus. See generally CHARLES C. MANN, 1491:
NEW REVELATIONS OF THE AMERICAS BEFORE COLUMBUS (Knopf 2005). There are also well
documented European-Asian and European-African encounters many hundreds of years before,
including commercial encounters along the Silk Road, and military encounters such as the GrecoPersian conflicts and Roman imperial projects in North Africa. It was the state-sponsored or staterelated encounters in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, however, that defined more contemporary
relations between European and non-European peoples and which were later reinforced in the newly
emerging international law and the conception of sovereignty growing from the Westphalian Peace of
the seventeenth century. See generally Robert H. Jackson, The Evolution of International Society, in
THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS 35 (John Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 2d ed. 2001).
3. This estimate is used by several institutions. See, e.g., Press Release, World Bank,
Indigenous Culture Fundamental to Global Development: World Bank’s Development Trends and
Indigenous Peoples’ Forum (Sept. 24, 2004) (on file with author); see also John A. Grim, Indigenous
Traditions and Ecology, available at http://fore.research.yale.edu/religion/indigenous/index.html (last
visited Sept. 15, 2008). The World Health Organization (WHO) has issued a report putting the number
at more than 300 million. See World Health Org., Report of the Director-General on Collaboration
Within the United Nations System and with Other Intergovernmental Organizations, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
A51/22 (Mar. 17, 1998).
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and fundamental freedoms”;4 the rights of “self-determination”5 and
“autonomy or self-government . . . relating to . . . internal affairs”;6 and
“the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.”7 Yet despite
its reach, this latest statement—indicative of indigenous land rights more
generally—remains constrained by its own terms8 and contested by states
with large and often dispossessed indigenous populations.9 To appreciate
the scope of indigenous land rights under current international law, it is
thus important to explore the history of sovereignty claims with respect to
indigenous lands, and assess the legacy of this history in human rights
instruments. It is also useful to begin with some discussion of the term
“indigenous.”
A. What is Meant by “Indigenous”?
The question of who is indigenous and what communities are the
subject of emerging international law relating to indigenous peoples is
complex and sometimes contested. Professor James Anaya has provided
one of the more concise understandings, explaining “the term indigenous
refers broadly to the living descendants of preinvasion inhabitants of lands
now dominated by others.”10 This brief reference elegantly highlights both
the geographic connection of indigenous peoples to traditional lands and
the fact that they are “engulfed” by a different, and dominant, culture.11 It
encompasses a broad group of diverse peoples that, he explains, “are
indigenous because their ancestral roots are embedded in the lands in
which they live, or would like to live, much more deeply than the roots of

4. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 1,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 U.N. Declaration].
5. Id. art. 3.
6. Id. art. 4.
7. Id. art. 26.
8. The text provides, for example, that “[n]othing in this Declaration may be . . . construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.” Id. art. 46.
9. See, e.g., Statements of the Representatives of the Governments of Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Colombia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Russia, and the United States at the 107th Plenary
Meeting of the General Assembly regarding the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg. at 11–27, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 (Sept. 13, 2007). The
comments of Mexico following the approval of the declaration are indicative: “The provisions . . .
relating to ownership, use, development and control of territories and resources shall not be understood
in a way that would undermine or diminish the forms and procedures relating to land ownership and
tenancy established in our constitution and laws relating to third-party acquired rights.” Id. at 23.
10. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2d ed. 2004).
11. Id.
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more powerful sectors of society living on the same lands or in close
proximity.12
Before Professor Anaya had offered this succinct formulation, a more
detailed definition was offered in the early 1980s by Jose R. Martinez
Cobo, the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities:13
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which,
having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial
societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves
distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and
transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their
ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples,
in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions
and legal systems.
This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an
extended period reaching into the present, of one or more of the
following factors:
a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them;
b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;
c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion,
living under a tribal system, membership of an indigenous
community, dress, means of livelihood, lifestyle, etc.);
d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue,
as the habitual means of communication at home or in the family, or
as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal language);

12. Id.
13. The Cobo Study was written over several years and published as U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/Sub.2/476/Add.1-4; U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/476/2/Add.5; U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/
Add.1-6; U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.6; U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.1-8; and U.N.
Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 [hereinafter Cobo Study]. These parts are being scanned and added to the
web site of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and are (or will be) available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/spdaip.html (last visited June 10, 2008).
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e) Residence on certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of
the world;
f) Other relevant factors.14
This 1986 definition is one of the most cited reference points for
defining “indigenous,”15 and it shares Professor Anaya’s later emphasis on
a connection to traditional lands and political subordination to a dominant
society. While neither Cobo nor Anaya seek to define what particular
connection to the land helps understand a people as indigenous, both stress
historical continuity—this connection and its importance—as part of a
core definition. The Cobo definition goes further in highlighting culture,
generally or “in specific manifestations” such as “means of livelihood.”16
Indigenous peoples’ own claims about their relationship to the land make
reference to spiritual and cultural concerns as well as economic (or
livelihood) concerns17
In 1995, the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous People (WGIP) asked
its chair, Erica-Irene Daes, to prepare “a note on the criteria for a
definition” of the concept of “indigenous.”18 While the WGIP continued to
look to Cobo’s definition, many expressed concern that the lack of a more
formal, accepted definition was being used by governments to deny the
recognition of indigenous groups.19 Daes complied and prepared a report,
but backed away from offering a single comprehensive definition.20
Instead, she offered:

14. Cobo Study, supra note 13, Part III, Conclusion, Proposals, and Recommendations,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983, reprinted at U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add. 4, ¶ 379-80.
15. This claim is made in a 2004 U.N. background paper on data collection relating to indigenous
peoples. See U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the Secretariat, Background Paper: The
Concept of Indigenous Peoples, at 1, U.N. Doc. PFII/2004/WS.1/3 (Jan. 19–21, 2004); see also
ANAYA, supra note 10, at 10 n.2.
16. See Cobo Study, supra note 13, Part III, Conclusion, Proposals, and Recommendations,
reprinted at E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983, ¶ 380(c).
17. See discussion infra Part III.F.
18. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub. Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination &
Prot. of Minorities, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Discrimination Against Indigenous
Peoples, ¶ 162, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/24 (Aug. 10, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 WGIP Report].
The request was later approved by the Commission on Human Rights. See ECOSOC, Sub. Comm. on
Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Working Group on Indigenous Populations,
Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/21 (Aug. 16, 1996) [hereinafter 1996
WGIP Report].
19. 1995 WGIP Report, supra note 18, ¶ 38.
20. ECOSOC, Sub. Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Working
Group on Indigenous Populations, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the
Rights of Indigenous People, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (June 10, 1996) (prepared by Erica-Irene A.
Daes) [hereinafter Daes Report].

2008]

BEYOND INDIGENOUS PROPERTY RIGHTS

61

[F]actors which modern international organizations and legal
experts (including indigenous legal experts and members of the
academic family), have considered relevant to the understanding of
the concept of “indigenous” include:
(a) Priority in time, with respect to the occupation and use of a
specific territory;
(b) The voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, which
may include the aspects of language, social organization, religion
and spiritual values, modes of production, laws and institutions;
(c) Self-identification, as well as recognition by other groups, or by
State authorities, as a distinct collectivity; and
(d) An experience of subjugation, marginalization, dispossession,
exclusion or discrimination, whether or not these conditions
persist.21
Daes emphasized that these “factors do not, and cannot, constitute an
inclusive or comprehensive definition.” 22 Instead she explained they “may
be present, to a greater or lesser degree, in different regions and in
different national and local contexts.”23
In a recent comprehensive volume on Indigenous Peoples and Human
Rights, Professor Patrick Thornberry offers an extended discussion of
“who is indigenous.”24 Professor Thornberry reflects on the approaches in
international instruments and reports that the Cobo definition continues to
function as a “vague gatekeeper” for the WGIP and institutions (such as
the World Bank), as well as claims and definitions from indigenous
communities and advocates.25 Thornberry also recounts the competing
claims advanced after the discovery of one of the oldest human skeletons
found in North America, near Kennewick, Washington. Attempts to
classify the skeleton morphologically (it did not appear “related to modern
American Indians”) as well as efforts by local Umatilla indigenous people
to repatriate the remains led to a battle between scientists and Umatilla

21. Id. ¶ 69.
22. Id. ¶ 70.
23. Id.
24. PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 33–60 (2002).
25. Id. at 33. This latter source is particularly important, as the theme of indigenous selfidentification has been an important feature of the interpretation of indigenous rights. See, e.g., infra
Part IV.A (discussing Awas Tingni) and Part V (discussing Moiwana Village). As Professor
Thornberry notes in discussing the arrival of Boers and Rehoboth Basters at the WGIP in the 1990s,
the reliance of self-identification is not without its challenges. THORNBERRY, supra note 24, at 60.
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representatives and “a swamp of fossilized politics, racial myth and
archaeological angst.”26
Thornberry explains that “the Kennewick debates suggest four
interwoven strands in ‘indigenous’.”27 These are (1) “association with a
particular place;” (2) “prior inhabitation;” (3) “a sense of original or first
inhabitants,” and (4) “distinctive societies.”28 For Thornberry, these
strands, which he calls the “Kennewick senses of indigenous,” are
important touchstones in understanding what is indigenous.29 While he
rejects the idea of a single, simple answer to the question of coherence in
the category of indigenous peoples, he argues that all these Kennewick
senses “are contained somewhere or other in the corpus of international
law.”30 He also identifies a “spectrum of factors” employed in instruments
and by commentators, “the ensemble of which is taken to portray the
subject of their concern.”31 These factors include: “precedent habitation;
historical continuity; attachment to land; the communal sense and the
community right (including those societies which do not have a strong
conception of individual rights); a cultural gap between the dominant
groups in a State and the indigenous, and the colonial context[; and,] . . .
self-identification as indigenous peoples.”32
Thornberry invited comparison of his factors to those proposed by
Daes in her 1995 report,33 and in many ways they are similar. But the
factors differ, perhaps, in one key respect. While Daes referred to “the
occupation and use of a specific territory,”34 Thornberry separately
identifies the importance of “precedent habitation, historical continuity,”
and “attachment to land.”35 In this sense, his factors reflect the claims of
distinctive connection that became more prominent following the Daes
Report. Indeed, in a subsequent working paper, Daes dealt specifically
with “indigenous peoples and their relationship to land.”36 Thornberry also

26. THORNBERRY, supra note 24, at 36 (quoting Tony Allen-Mills, Ancient Bones Make White
Mischief in U.S., THE SUNDAY TIMES, June 15, 1997, at 22) (internal quotations omitted).
27. Id. at 37.
28. Id. at 37–39 (emphasis omitted).
29. Id. at 51.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 55.
32. Id. (emphasis omitted).
33. Id. at 55 n.170.
34. WGIP Report, supra note 18, ¶ 69.
35. THORNBERRY, supra note 24, at 55.
36. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Final Working Paper:
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Indigenous Peoples and Minorities: Indigenous People
and their Relationship to Land, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21 (June 11, 2001) (prepared by EricaIrene A. Daes).
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compared his factors to those offered by Benedict Kingsbury in a piece
that addressed the challenges of indigenous peoples in Asia.37 Kingsbury
had divided his factors into “requirements” and “indicia” and included
“affinity with . . . land” as a “[s]trong [i]ndicia” of indigenousness.38
This Article does not depend on any one approach to defining
“indigenous,” relying instead on the insights recounted above of those who
have studied the question from an international human rights law
perspective. It is important to note, however, that a unique relationship
with the land is inherent in most of these understandings of what is
indigenous. It is also a critical feature of many public statements by
indigenous peoples and advocates.39 Thus, it should be seen not merely as
a collateral feature of an indigenous lifestyle, but rather as a core element
of indigenous identity.
B. Of Discovery, Conquest, and Consent
The treatment of indigenous peoples’ land rights—often the utter
negation of those rights—was a defining feature of international law
almost from the moment European powers first formally encountered the
inhabitants of Africa, Asia, and the Americas. Even at a time when the
body of law we now consider “international” was largely prenatal, the
disregard of non-European land rights by European political powers was
palpable.
The Papal Bull Inter Caetera, issued in 1493, is an early example.40
Within a year of Columbus’ first voyage to the Western Hemisphere, the
pope had taken special note of those “certain very remote islands and even
mainlands that hitherto had not been discovered by others; wherein dwell
very many peoples living in peace, and, as reported, going unclothed, and
not eating flesh,”41 and proceeded to divide between the Kingdoms of
Portugal and Spain all newly “discovered” territory occupied by these
“many peoples.”42 This papal pronouncement regarded inhabitants in this
territory as subjects for spiritual and moral conquest—issuing a

37. THORNBERRY, supra note 24, at 56.
38. Benedict Kingsbury, The Applicability of the International Legal Concept of “Indigenous
Peoples” in Asia, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 336, 374 (Joanne R. Bauer &
Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999).
39. See discussion infra Part III.F.
40. POPE ALEXANDER VI, THE BULL INTER CAETERA (May 4, 1493), translated in EUROPEAN
TREATIES BEARING ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES TO 1648 73, 75–
78 (Frances Gardiner Davenport ed., trans., 1917).
41. Id. at 76.
42. Id. at 76–78.
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“command” that the king and queen of Spain43 “should appoint to the
aforesaid mainlands and islands worthy, God-fearing, learned, skilled, and
experienced men, in order to instruct the aforesaid inhabitants and
residents in the Catholic faith and train them in good morals.”44
The vigor with which the crown’s “worthy” men pursued the papal
charge is a matter of record. Bartolomé de las Casas, an immigrant to
Hispaniola (present-day Haiti and the Dominican Republic) in 1502 who
later became a Dominican priest, reported at length on Spanish brutality
toward their new “subjects” in the Caribbean and Central America,
describing the extent to which the indigenous populations were
dehumanized and dispossessed:
The Spaniards have shown not the slightest consideration for these
people, treating them (and I speak from first-hand experience,
having been there from the outset) not as brute animals—indeed I
would to God they had done and had shown them the consideration
they afford their animals—so much as piles of dung in the middle of
the road.45
Las Casas noted the extent to which indigenous lands were seized and
populations removed in a manner consistent with this low esteem. He
reported that Hispaniola’s population had been reduced from “some three
million” to only about two hundred and that half a million were forcibly
moved from the Bahamas to Hispaniola to “make up losses among the
indigenous population of that island.”46
The reports of Las Casas are a rare first-hand written account of the
European encounter, but history has revealed that indigenous populations
throughout the Americas, as well as Africa and Asia, were held in similar
regard by colonial powers.47 Indigenous lives, along with their interests in
the land where they had lived, were disregarded and exploited. The nationstates that emerged from this colonial period and inherited the territories
thus acquired were occasionally called upon to justify their inheritance in

43. More precisely, “the illustrious sovereigns, our very dear son in Christ, Ferdinand, king, and
our very dear daughter in Christ, Isabella, queen of Castile, Leon, Aragon, Sicily, and Granada” (now,
with the exception of Sicily, parts of Spain). Id. at 75.
44. Id. at 77.
45. BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS, A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE INDIES 13
(Nigel Griffin ed., trans., 1992).
46. Id. at 11–12.
47. See, e.g., EDMUND D. MOREL, KING LEOPOLD’S RULE IN AFRICA 103 (1904) (describing the
Belgian conquest of the Congo: “[t]he carnival of massacre, of which the Congo Territories have been
the scene for the last twelve years, must appal (sic) all those who have studied the facts. From 1890
onwards the records of the Congo State have been literally blood-soaked.”).
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the face of claims about indigenous property rights. They employed either
a doctrine of conquest or doctrine of discovery, which privileged a
“discovering” European state over all other European states to claim
sovereignty over new territories as though the land had been uninhabited
at the time of European arrival.48
This idea that the land in possession of indigenous peoples was like a
blank slate was sometimes called terra nullius49 or vacuum domicilium.50
In Emmerich de Vattel’s eighteenth century treatise The Law of Nations,
the failure of indigenous peoples to “settle and cultivate” the land was
offered as a justification for “tak[ing] possession of some part of a vast
country, in which there are none but erratic nations whose scanty
population is incapable of occupying the whole.”51 Vattel recognized an
“oblig[ation] . . . to cultivate the land” which was “imposed by nature on
mankind.”52 He reasoned this would prevent a European power from
claiming lands that it could not fully occupy and exploit,53 arguing that
this same principle should apply to indigenous populations whose:
[U]nsettled habitation in those immense regions connot [sic] be
accounted a true and legal possession; and the people of Europe, too
closely pent up at home, finding land of which the savages stood in
no particular need, and of which they made no actual and constant
use, were lawfully entitled to take possession of it, and settle it with
colonies.54
Not all political theorists held that indigenous title was without any
effect, though the entire discourse about indigenous property rights among
European and colonial scholars during the fifteenth through nineteenth
centuries seemed to begin with a fundamental negation of indigenous
civilization. Mark F. Lindley published a treatise in 1926 classifying
colonial period views on the legal status of indigenous lands (termed the

48. See, e.g., FRANKE WILMER, THE INDIGENOUS VOICE IN WORLD POLITICS: SINCE TIME
IMMEMORIAL (1993).
49. See, e.g., SVEN LUNDQVIST, TERRA NULLIUS: A JOURNEY THROUGH NO ONE’S LAND (Sarah
Death trans., 2007).
50. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP,
USE, AND CONSERVATION 4 (2005).
51. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 99–100 (Joseph Chitty ed.,
1863) (1758).
52. Id. at 35.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 100.
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land of “backward races”).55 He grouped views into three categories: (I)
those regarding indigenous title as good against more “civilized peoples,”
(II) those regarding indigenous title to exist, but to be qualified, and (III)
those believing indigenous rights are not of “such a nature” as to bar
assumption of sovereignty by “more highly civilized peoples.”56 Thus, for
some, lawful acquisition of indigenous lands required conquest or treaty,
and for others a claim of discovery could be made despite prior habitation.
For the latter group, Vattel’s natural law argument about the need to
“make use of” the land seemed to resonate. “The earth,” he had reasoned,
“belongs to mankind in general, and was designed to furnish them with
subsistence.”57 Indigenous peoples, by virtue of their limited cultivation
and use had created a vacuum sufficient to forfeit any claim to
sovereignty. Vattel’s reasoning is echoed, for example, in a landmark case
from the early nineteenth century United States, Johnson & Graham’s
Lessee v. M’Intosh,58 where the U.S. Supreme Court faced competing
property claims by one who held title acquired from the federal
government and another who held title that traced to a direct private
purchase from an indigenous tribe during the British colonial period. In
rejecting the title of direct indigenous origin, the Court was forced to
justify the extinguishment of indigenous land title by colonial occupation.
The Court explained that “[i]n the establishment of these [colonial]
relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance,
entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent,
impaired.”59
The Court in M’Intosh sought to defend the loss of indigenous title by
the nature of indigenous land use. While seeming to reject Vattel’s
premise and protesting that it would not “enter into the controversy,
whether agriculturists, merchants, and manufacturers, have a right, on
abstract principles, to expel hunters from the territory they possess, or to
contract their limits[,]”60 the Court nevertheless reasoned:
The tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages,
whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn

55. M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11–19 (1926); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 141
(1894); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 18 COMMENTARIES *26–27.
56. LINDLEY, supra note 55.
57. VATTEL, supra note 51, at 100.
58. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 588.
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chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country
was to leave the country a wilderness . . . . What was the inevitable
consequence of this state of things? The Europeans were under the
necessity either of abandoning the country, and relinquishing their
pompous claims to it, or of enforcing those claims by the sword,
and by the adoption of principles adapted to the condition of a
people with whom it was impossible to mix, and who could not be
governed as a distinct society, or of remaining in their
neighborhood, and exposing themselves and their families to the
perpetual hazard of being massacred.61
The M’Intosh Court appeared troubled by the “inevitable consequence”
of its reasoning, but still seemed bound by the logic of these inherited
colonial legal principles (and the fact that much of the United States was at
the time either settled or being settled on the basis of these principles).62
“However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an
inhabited country into conquest may appear,” the Court seemed to lament,
“if the principle has been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards
sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the property
of the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of
the land, and cannot be questioned.”63
In a far more recent case, the Australian High Court challenged the
vitality of the terra nullius doctrine, at once rejecting it and embracing its
consequences. In a 1992 decision, Mabo v. Queensland,64 the court
explained:
When . . . the Crown acquired sovereignty recognized by the
European family of nations under the enlarged notion of terra
nullius, it was necessary for the common law to prescribe a doctrine
relating to the law to be applied in such colonies, for sovereignty
imports supreme internal legal authority . . . . The view was taken
that, when sovereignty of a territory could be acquired under the
enlarged notion of terra nullius, for the purposes of the municipal
law that territory (though inhabited) could be treated as a “desert
uninhabited” country . . . . [T]he indigenous inhabitants of a settled

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 590.
Id.
Id. at 591.
Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.
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colony had no recognized sovereign, else the territory could have
been acquired only by conquest or cession.65
The court linked the ability of European colonial powers to see
indigenous lands as “vacant” to the comparative lack of social
organization among indigenous communities: “As the indigenous
inhabitants of a settled colony were regarded as ‘low in the scale of social
organization’, they and their occupancy of colonial land were ignored in
considering the title to land in a settled colony.”66
The Mabo court found the terra nullius doctrine largely discredited, and
held it could not be used to justify denial of indigenous land rights, yet the
court stopped short of rejecting Australian sovereignty over the lands
claimed under the doctrine.67 In a separate opinion, two justices explained
that “communal native title” had “qualified and reduced” the “Crown’s
ownership” of the lands in dispute, but acknowledged that the Crown
retained sovereignty and that native title could be extinguished by
legislative or executive act. 68
While this seemingly inconsistent result can be criticized,69 one can see
the Australian High Court struggling with the same challenge that
confronted the U.S. Supreme Court more than a century before, and
resolving the challenge in a related way. While Australia’s court sitting in
the twentieth century could draw on a new understanding of indigenous
rights, it still found itself a creature of a sovereign that could not, as a
practical matter, challenge its master’s sovereignty. The court admitted as
much when it cautioned: “[R]ecognition by our common law of the rights
and interests in land of the indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony
would be precluded if the recognition were to fracture a skeletal principle
of our legal system.”70
Professor Thornberry notes that the doctrine of terra nullius was rarely
exercised per se in the acquisition of inhabited lands and the idea that
indigenous lands were akin to uninhabited territory “remained something

65. Id. ¶ 36.
66. Id. ¶ 39. This idea was not limited to Australia and the Americas, but also justified colonial
expropriations elsewhere, including in Africa. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12,
at 39 (Oct. 16) (“‘Occupation’ being legally an original means of peaceably acquiring sovereignty over
territory otherwise than by cession or succession, it was a cardinal condition of a valid ‘occupation’
that the territory should be terra nullius—a territory belonging to no-one—at the time of the act
alleged to constitute the ‘occupation’.”).
67. See generally Mabo, 175 C.L.R.
68. Mabo, opinion of Deane and Gaudron, JJ., 175 C.L.R. ¶ 76(2).
69. See, e.g., Henry Reynolds, After Mabo, What About Aboriginal Sovereignty?, AUSTL.
HUMAN. REV., Apr. 1996.
70. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. ¶ 43.
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of an academic conceit.”71 He points out that in Africa, for example, land
rights were more often subjects of “treaty races” where title “was
generally based upon claims that it had been ceded by consent of African
rulers, or, much less frequently, that it had been acquired by right of
conquest.”72 This approach to acquisition, justified even by those theorists
falling into Lindley’s category I (those who would recognize indigenous
title as valid against “more civilized” peoples) remains difficult to defend
in light of inequalities in power between the parties and very different
cultural conceptions of land ownership and title.73 Thus, while the idea of
consent was employed, it was not an idea that could bear much scrutiny.
At bottom, whether through conquest, discovery, or consent, the results
of what Thornberry calls “saltwater colonialism”74 were the same.
Indigenous peoples were either extinguished, removed, or subordinated to
new political powers with very different identities and approaches to land
and resource development.
C. An Emerging Claim of Indigenous Land Rights
Even as domestic jurists in cases such as Mabo struggled to revisit
doctrines of conquest and discovery while preserving their state’s
sovereign prerogative, the international human rights discourse brought
new support to indigenous claims of right including land rights.
International law began moving from what Professor Anaya has called “a
complicity with the often brutal forces that wrested lands from indigenous
peoples”75 to embrace a normative construct with greater concern for
individual and group rights. Instruments and institutions emerged that both
“rehumanized” indigenous peoples and revisited claims about their
sovereignty and land rights.
The International Labour Organization (ILO) took a major step in 1957
with approval of ILO Convention No. 107, which responded to studies and
expert meetings on the vulnerability of indigenous workers and called for
the “protection” and “progressive integration” of indigenous “into the life
of their respective countries.”76 ILO No. 107 focused on members of

71. THORNBERRY, supra note 24, at 74–76.
72. Id. at 75–76 (quoting Hedley Bull, European States and African Political Commentaries, in
THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 111 (Hedley Bull & Adam Watson eds., 1984)).
73. See, e.g., RUSSELL SHORTO, ISLAND AT THE CENTER OF THE WORLD 79–90 (2004) (and
citations therein); IAN BROWNLIE, TREATIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (1992).
74. THORNBERRY, supra note 24, at 48.
75. ANAYA, supra note 10, at 49.
76. International Labour Organization, Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Populations, June
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indigenous groups rather than groups themselves, and its emphasis on
“progressive integration” seems at odds with a concern over cultural
integrity.77 It does, however, recognize the “right of ownership, collective
or individual, of the members of the populations concerned over the lands
which these populations traditionally occupy,” place limits on removal
from “habitual territories,” and call for respect of customary land tenure
systems.78 Professor Anaya points out that the recognition of customary
laws and collective ownership rights is “posited as transitory and hence
overshadowed by a persistent deference and even preference for national
programs of integration and noncoercive assimilation.”79 He also notes
that there was “no apparent participation on the part of indigenous
peoples’ own designated representatives” in the process of formulating the
convention.80
ILO No. 107 has been followed by ILO No. 169, adopted in 1989,
which moves away from ILO No. 107’s assimilationist approach. ILO No.
169 places greater emphasis on indigenous peoples and cultures, calling
for “special measures” for “safeguarding the persons, institutions,
property, labor, cultures and environment of the peoples concerned,”81 and
makes clear that “[s]uch special measures shall not be contrary to the
freely-expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.”82 It also calls for states
to respect the relationship indigenous peoples have with their “lands or
territories” and to recognize “rights of ownership and possession” of
traditionally occupied lands.83
A number of other international and regional instruments, institutions,
and tribunal decisions have emerged that similarly support claims to
indigenous traditional lands and territories. This includes the creation of
the WGIP; the appointment of Special Rapporteurs on Indigenous Rights;
decisions of the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC) and Commission

26, 1957, ILO No. 107, art. 2(1), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C107
[hereinafter ILO No. 107].
77. Id.
78. Id. arts. 11, 12, 13.
79. ANAYA, supra note 10, at 55.
80. Id. at 54.
81. International Labour Organization, Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, Sept. 5, 1991, ILO No. 169, art. 4(1), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/
cgi-lex/convde.pl?C169 [hereinafter ILO No. 169]. Although ILO No. 169 is considered a revision of
ILO No. 107, and thus the prior convention is deemed outdated, there are eighteen countries that have
ratified ILO No. 107 but not ILO No. 169. A total of nineteen countries have ratified ILO No. 169. See
ILO Ratification Table, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm (last visited Sept. 1,
2008).
82. ILO No. 169, supra note 81, art. 4(2).
83. Id. arts. 13, 14.
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on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD); decisions of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Inter-American Court
of Human Rights; the formulation of World Bank Operational Policies;
and most recently the adoption of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.84 They can collectively be seen as recognizing claims
to land that were long denied in international law. As Professor Anaya
notes, the activity that led to these and other measures “has involved, and
substantially been driven by, indigenous peoples themselves.”85 His
premise, that international law, “once an instrument of colonialism, has
developed and continues to develop, however grudgingly or imperfectly,
to support indigenous peoples’ demands,”86 is difficult to challenge. In the
area of land rights, however, the imperfections remain somewhat glaring
and also perhaps inevitable. There remains a dichotomy between title and
sovereignty that is a legacy of earlier doctrines of conquest and discovery.
Having once denied sovereignty, title, and often personhood to indigenous
peoples, it is a difficult project to recognize collective indigenous title
(which has implications for tenurial relationships and development
decisions) while allowing a surrounding state to retain ultimate
sovereignty. It is a conflict at the heart of decisions such as M’Intosh and
Mabo, and one that remains difficult to reconcile. The recognition of the
distinctive relationship indigenous peoples have to the land may be one
key to such a reconciliation.
III. ASSERTING A DISTINCTIVE CONNECTION TO THE LAND
The emergence of indigenous peoples’ land rights in international law
has been closely tied to the recognition that indigenous peoples have a
distinctive social, cultural, and spiritual relationship with traditional lands
and natural resources. This is evident in instruments such as the 2007 U.N.
Declaration on Indigenous Rights, in institutional guidelines such as the
World Bank’s operational policies, and in claims made by indigenous
peoples and their advocates.

84. See discussion infra Part III. These measures are discussed in detail in the following two
Parts of this Article, with a specific focus on terms that deal with indigenous land rights and the
distinctive connection that indigenous peoples are understood to have with the land.
85. ANAYA, supra note 10, at 56.
86. Id. at 4.
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A. The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The most recent instrument to acknowledge this relationship is the
2007 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.87 The
declaration links colonization and dispossession to concerns over selfdetermination and cultural traditions in a way that obliquely, yet
affirmatively, ties the loss of land to the loss of cultural rights. The
preamble, for example, expresses concern over “colonization and
dispossession of [indigenous] lands, territories and resources,” and claims
that “control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting them and
their lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain and
strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions.”88 One might argue
that this claim is not unique to indigenous peoples: territorial control by
any population will enable institutions, cultures, and traditions. But the
language in context ties indigenous institutions, culture, and tradition to
the land in a way that is unique. The “inherent rights of indigenous
peoples” to their “lands, territories, and resources,” the preamble tells us,
“derive from” indigenous “cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and
philosophies.”89 Thus land rights are not incidental to culture, but integral
to identity.
This claim is qualitatively different from human rights doctrine relating
to non-indigenous property rights, which are understood as a universal
right untethered to the cultures, spiritual traditions, histories or
philosophies of claimants. Here, though, the declaration explicitly
embraces a “land-identity uniqueness” claim: “Indigenous peoples have
the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship
with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands,
territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their
responsibilities to future generations in this regard.”90
The declaration further upholds the right to traditional medicines and
health practices, “including the conservation of their vital medicinal
plants, animals and minerals”;91 highlighting resources with cultural as
well as medicinal value. Article 26 calls for “legal recognition and
protection” of traditional “lands, territories and resources. . . . with due
respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

2007 U.N. Declaration, supra note 4.
Id. pmbl.
Id.
Id. art. 25.
Id. art. 24.
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indigenous peoples concerned,”92 thus addressing questions of traditional
tenure that historically led to the dispossession of indigenous peoples.93
The declaration also confirms specific environmental and conservation
rights of indigenous peoples.94 This includes full, prior, and informed
participation in decisions relating to lands, territories, and resources,
“particularly in connection with the development, utilization or
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources,”95 as well as prohibitions
on hazardous material storage or disposal and military activities.96 It also
confirms the right of indigenous peoples “to determine and develop
priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or
territories and other resources,”97 and requires effective mechanisms “to
mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual
impact” of development and land use.98 Thus, in addition to claiming that
indigenous peoples have a distinctive connection to their lands, the
declaration makes guarantees consistent with this connection and at many
points directly implies that environmental impact may also imply cultural
or spiritual impact.
B. The International Labour Organization
ILO No. 169 likewise recognizes the unique relationship of indigenous
communities99 to land, stating that “governments shall respect the special
importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned
of their relationship with the lands or territories . . . and in particular the
collective aspects of this relationship.”100 It also calls for special measures
to safeguard “the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and

92. Id. art. 26(3).
93. See discussion supra Part II.B.
94. See, e.g., 2007 U.N. Declaration, supra note 4, arts. 29–32.
95. Id. art. 32.
96. Id. arts. 29, 30.
97. Id. art. 32.
98. Id.
99. Note the implicit definition of indigenous peoples in ILO No. 169, stating the convention
applies to “[t]ribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions
distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly
or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations.” ILO No. 169, supra
note 81, art. 1(a). It also emphasizes, as have other efforts to define, “[s]elf-identification as
indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion.” Id. art. 1(2).
100. Id. art. 13.
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environment” of indigenous peoples,101 including punishment for
trespass.102
The convention calls for the participation of indigenous peoples in
deciding “their own priorities for the process of development as it affects
their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they
occupy or otherwise use . . . .”103 It also provides that development
activities be preceded by assessment of “social, spiritual, cultural and
environmental impact,”104 and calls for mitigation “in co-operation with
the peoples concerned, to protect and preserve the environment of the
territories they inhabit.”105 Thus, as the 2007 U.N. Declaration, ILO No.
169 directly acknowledges a unique relationship to the land, and explicitly
links “social, spiritual, cultural and environmental impacts.”106
C. Regional Human Rights Instruments
The proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples107 likewise recognizes “the respect for the environment accorded
by the cultures of indigenous peoples of the Americas,” and “the special
relationship between the indigenous peoples and the environment, lands,
resources and territories on which they live”;108 combining the idea of a
unique connection to the land with a claim regarding indigenous peoples
as environmental stewards. It also claims “in many indigenous cultures,
traditional collective systems for control and use of land, territory, and
resources, including bodies of water and coastal areas, are a necessary
condition for their survival, social organization, development and their

101. Id. art. 4.
102. Id. art. 18. The convention provides: “Adequate penalties shall be established by law for
unauthorised intrusion upon, or use of, the lands of the peoples concerned, and governments shall take
measures to prevent such offences.” Id.
103. ILO No. 169, supra note 81, art. 7(1). The ILO notes that committees established to examine
representations brought against states under Article 24 of the ILO Constitution have repeatedly dealt
with the Article 17 duty of consultation prior to the exploration or exploitation of natural resources on
the lands they occupy or use. See International Labour Organization, Standards and Supervision: Main
Situations Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples which ILO Supervision Has Dealt With (on file
with author), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/french/indigenous/standard/super1.htm (last
visited Oct. 3, 2007).
104. ILO No. 169, supra note 81, art. 7(3).
105. Id. art. 7(4).
106. Id.
107. American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OEA/Ser/L/V/.II.95, doc.6 (draft approved Feb. 26, 1997) [hereinafter American Declaration].
108. Id. pmbl., ¶ 3; see also Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96, doc. 10 rev. (Apr. 24, 1997).
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individual and collective well-being . . . .”109 It would require measures to
protect “sacred sites”110 and affirm an indigenous “right to the protection
of vital medicinal plants, animals, and minerals in their traditional
territories.”111
The proposed American Declaration features extensive provisions on
the “right to environmental protection,”112 including a claim that
“indigenous peoples have the right to a safe and healthy environment,
which is an essential condition for the enjoyment of the right to life and
collective well-being.”113 This language suggests that indigenous
environmental rights might be both civil and political (relating to life) and
economic, social, and cultural rights (collective well-being). While these
rights should be understood as universal and indivisible, they are often
classified and addressed separately.114
The American Declaration would provide for early, informed, and
active indigenous participation in environmental and land use matters
affecting their lands,115 and require that states respond to and punish
environmental harms affecting indigenous peoples.116 It also explicitly
advances an indigenous “right to conserve, restore and protect their
environment and the productive capacity of their lands, territories and
resources.”117 This includes a “right to assistance from their states” and
from international organizations “for purposes of environmental
protection.”118 This language is interesting both in its implicit
acknowledgement of state sovereignty over indigenous lands and in its
approval of arrangements whereby indigenous peoples may receive direct
international assistance from institutions such as World Bank and others
that might otherwise require state permission before funding projects
within national territories.
The American Declaration would protect “traditional forms of property
ownership” linked explicitly with “cultural survival.”119 It also includes
provisions comparable to the 2007 U.N. Declaration regarding alienability

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

American Declaration, supra note 107, pmbl., ¶ 5.
Id. art. X, ¶ 3.
Id. art. XII, ¶ 2.
Id. art. XIII.
Id. art. XIII, ¶ 1.
HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW,
POLITICS, MORALS 237–38 (2d ed. 2000).
115. American Declaration, supra note 107, art. XIII, ¶¶ 2, 4, 7.
116. Id. art. XIII, ¶ 6.
117. Id. art. XIII, ¶ 3.
118. Id. art. XIII, ¶ 5.
119. Id. art. XVIII.
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of lands and property rights from indigenous to non-indigenous peoples,
although the language differs in important respects. The American
Declaration would “recognize the [land] titles of indigenous peoples . . . as
permanent, exclusive, inalienable, imprescriptible and indefeasible,”120
and provides that “titles may be changed only by mutual consent between
the state and the respective indigenous peoples.”121 In contrast, the 2007
U.N. Convention provides for consultation,122 but would not appear to
require mutual consent. One might argue that the American Declaration
thus represents a different view about underlying indigenous sovereignty,
but both approaches still constrain an indigenous community wishing to
act on its own, and in this regard both are freighted with ideas of state
sovereignty (if not paternalism).
Whatever message the American Declaration may send regarding
continuing state sovereignty over indigenous lands, it settles the question
of usufructuary rights decidedly in favor of indigenous peoples who, it
provides,
have the right to an effective legal framework for the protection of
their rights with respect to the natural resources on their lands,
including the ability to use, manage, and conserve such resources,
and with respect to traditional uses of their lands, interest in lands,
and resources, such as subsistence.123
Where the state retains subsurface rights (not uncommon in the
Americas), the American Declaration would require prior participation in
decisions about impact on the “interests” of indigenous peoples, and
participation in the “benefits of such activities,” including compensation
for any negative impact.124 The proposed American Declaration also
requires prior informed consent and compensation where expropriation is
contemplated.125 It would also require states to “take all measures . . . to
avert, prevent and punish” trespass.126
Regional human rights instruments in Africa and Europe do not address
the concerns of indigenous peoples in the same manner as in the inter-

120. Id. art. XVIII, ¶ 3(i).
121. Id. art. XVIII, ¶ 3(ii). It is worth noting that the declaration would explicitly reserve the right
of indigenous communities to make decisions about the allocation of ownership within the community
“in accordance with their customs, traditions, uses and traditional practices.” Id. art. XVIII, ¶ 3(iii).
122. 2007 U.N. Declaration, supra note 4, art. 17, ¶ 2.
123. American Declaration, supra note 107, art. XVIII, ¶ 4.
124. Id. art. XVIII, ¶ 5.
125. Id. art. XVIII, ¶ 6.
126. Id. art. XVIII, ¶ 8.
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American system.127 Property rights provisions do not deal explicitly with
indigenous lands, nor make an explicit link between indigenous peoples
and their cultural or spiritual regard for the land. Some property rights
provisions could be used to advance the concerns of indigenous
communities, such as the Banjul Charter’s declarations that “the right to
property . . . may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or
in the general interest of the community,”128 and that “all peoples shall
freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources,” a right to be
“exercised in the exclusive interest of the people.”129 These provisions
place the “community” or “people’s” interest at the center of decisions
about property in a way that might advance indigenous community
interests without making explicit reference to indigenous status or a
unique connection to the land. The Banjul Charter also declares that “[a]ll
peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural
development with due regard to their freedom and identity . . . .”130 Again,
this provision makes no reference to indigenous peoples or land
connectedness. It could, however, provide a basis for advancing the kind
of land rights indigenous communities seek, by explicitly tying economic
with social and cultural development in a single phrase that also calls for
due regard to identity.
Environmental provisions of the Banjul Charter likewise make no
separate reference to indigenous peoples, but instead provide that “[a]ll
peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable
to their development.”131 Coupled with the provisions just examined
calling for the protection of economic and cultural rights, an argument
could be constructed for the protection of traditional communities that
might fit into a broader understanding of the term indigenous. The African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) used these
provisions in tandem to protect the Ogoni people from the impact of oil
drilling operations of the state oil company in consortium with Shell
Petroleum Development Corporation. In Social and Economic Rights

127. This article deals only with inter-American, African, and European regional instruments
because other regional instruments have not yet progressed beyond drafts and discussions, although
the proposed Asian Human Rights Charter does include the section “Indigenous/Tribal/Peoples’
Rights.” See Asian Human Rights Commission, Asian Human Rights Charter, available at
http://material.ahrchk.net/charter/mainfile.php/draft_charter/ (last visited July 5, 2007).
128. Organization of African Unity, Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 14, June
27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter Banjul Charter]. The Banjul Charter is the core African Human
Rights instrument, sometimes referred to as the African Charter rather than the Banjul Charter.
129. Id. art. 21.
130. Id. art. 22, ¶ 1.
131. Id. art. 24.
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Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria
(SERAC),132 the ACHPR cited the Banjul Charter’s Article 24
environmental provisions and Article 21 provisions on wealth, natural
resources, and economic exploitation (along with human health
provisions) to find that Nigeria and Shell had violated the rights of the
Ogoni.133 The ACHPR rebuked the government’s failure to engage the
Ogoni people in development decisions affecting their lands. “In all their
dealings with the Oil Consortiums,” the ACHPR found, “the government
did not involve the Ogoni Communities in the decisions that affected the
development of Ogoniland.”134 The ACHPR placed the origins of the
Banjul Charter’s Article 21 provisions on wealth, natural resources, and
economic exploitation in a context with strong parallels to the history of
colonial encounters with indigenous peoples in other regions:
The origin of this provision may be traced to colonialism, during
which the human and material resources of Africa were largely
exploited for the benefit of outside powers, creating tragedy for
Africans themselves, depriving them of their birthright and
alienating them from the land. The aftermath of colonial
exploitation has left Africa’s precious resources and people still
vulnerable to foreign misappropriation.135
Thus, despite the unique history and contemporary political structures
that distinguish Africa, one can see in the region’s provisions dealing with
land and resource rights clear traces of the “saltwater colonialism” that
Thornberry notes is common to the indigenous experience.136 Missing is
an explicit claim about an indigenous identity linked to the land in a
spiritual or cultural sense, although the ACHPR’s concern with preserving
the African birthright and “alienation” from the land and its willingness to
use the Banjul Charter’s broader provisions on natural resources to protect
the Ogoni people suggest at least an implicit acknowledgement of some
special connectedness.

132. Soc. and Econ. Rights Action Ctr. & the Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights v. Nigeria, Afr.
Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 155/96 (2001).
133. Id. ¶ 58 (findings regarding Article 21 violations) and ¶ 54 (findings regarding Article 24
violations).
134. Id. ¶ 55.
135. Id. ¶ 56.
136. See THORNBERRY, supra note 24, at 48.
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D. Other International Instruments
In 1992, government leaders from 172 countries met at the U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)137 and adopted
an action plan addressing a range of environmental and natural resources
challenges within a framework of sustainable and equitable development.
That action plan, Agenda 21, recognized that “[i]ndigenous people and
their communities have an historical relationship with their lands and are
generally descendants of the original inhabitants of such lands.”138 The
term “lands” was “understood to include the environment of the areas
which the people concerned traditionally occupy,”139 and Agenda 21
acknowledged that indigenous peoples and their communities “have
developed over many generations a holistic traditional scientific
knowledge of their lands, natural resources and environment.”140 Agenda
21 also stressed that the cultural and physical well-being of indigenous
peoples are linked to the land and its development, providing:
In view of the interrelationship between the natural environment
and its sustainable development and the cultural, social, economic
and physical well-being of indigenous people, national and
international efforts to implement environmentally sound and
sustainable development should recognize, accommodate, promote
and strengthen the role of indigenous people and their
communities.141
Agenda 21 called for protection of indigenous peoples from
environmentally unsound activities as well as those “the indigenous people
concerned consider to be socially and culturally inappropriate.”142 This
provision acknowledges not only that activities affecting the environment
may be particularly inappropriate from an indigenous perspective, but also
that the determination of sociocultural appropriateness should be left to
“the indigenous people concerned.” Such an approach is consistent with
areas of law that protect spiritual and religious rights without imposing

137. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (1992), www.un.org/geninfo/bp/
enviro.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). UNCED was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and is sometimes
referred to as the “Rio Conference.”
138. U.N. Dep’t of Int’l Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Div. of Sustainable Dev., Agenda 21, ¶ 26.1,
available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm [hereinafter
Agenda 21].
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. ¶ 26.3(a)(ii).
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outside definitions or interpretations on those who would exercise them. It
admits both a respect for the indigenous-environment relationship and an
unwillingness to constrain that relationship through a meaning imposed by
dominant cultures or through some universal definition.
Agenda 21 also recognizes “that traditional and direct dependence on
renewable resources and ecosystems, including sustainable harvesting,
continues to be essential to the cultural, economic and physical well-being
of indigenous people and their communities.”143 This provision is
important not only because it reasserts a concern with indigenous cultural
and physical well-being tied to the environment,144 but also because it
employs the idea of dependence on ecosystems as well as resources.
Ecosystem dependence is far deeper and more integral than a dependence
on any one natural resource or feature because it contemplates dependence
on the entire system, including biological, chemical, and physical
elements, and their interaction with one another.145 Participants in UNCED
certainly understood the significance of this distinction, and if applied in
its most appropriate and robust meaning, it would offer a measure of
protection for claims to traditional lands which have unique ecosystems
that cannot be seen as fungible. More important with respect to complex
systemic environmental claims (such as climate change), a recognition that
indigenous peoples’ rights include ecosystem integrity could be seen to
protect elements of the natural environment (such as weather patterns and
nutrient cycles) that may directly affect a subsistence resource (such as
water or fish stocks) or at least influence the long term availability or
health of that resource.
The UNCED conference also hosted the signing of the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD),146 which recognized “the close and traditional
dependence of many indigenous and local communities embodying
traditional lifestyles on biological resources.”147 The CBD recognizes both
a benefit to indigenous communities in the conservation of biological
resources and also a benefit to the broader society in “sharing equitably

143. Id. ¶ 26.3(a)(iv).
144. The concern with physical well-being is common to both paragraphs 26.1 and 26.3.
145. An “ecosystem” is understood as a “[c]ommunity of organisms interacting with one another
and with the chemical and physical factors making up their environment.” G. TYLER MILLER, JR.,
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE: SUSTAINING THE EARTH A7 (1991). The chemical and physical factors
include sunlight, rainfall, soil nutrients, climate, salinity, etc. See M. Lynne Corn, Ecosystems, Biomes,
and Watersheds: Definitions and Use, Cong. Research Serv. Rep., 103d Cong. (July 14, 1993),
available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-70:1.
146. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1993 U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter CBD].
147. Id. pmbl.
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benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge, innovations and
practices relevant to the conservation of biological diversity and the
sustainable use of its components.”148 In this sense, it offers an argument
of instrumental value to non-indigenous communities not typically
advanced in the context of indigenous rights. Those rights are often
expressed in terms of their importance to indigenous peoples and the
moral obligation of non-indigenous populations,149 but the CBD was clear
that social and economic advantages flow to non-indigenous societies,
who enjoy the benefits of traditional knowledge and practices150—
recognizing, for example, the value of “indigenous and traditional
knowledge” relating to biological diversity.151
E. Institutional Treatment—The World Bank’s Operational Policies
The World Bank developed an internal policy on “tribal peoples” in
1981, in response to protests over the impact of a bank-financed
hydroelectric project in the Philippines’ Chico River Basin.152 The bank
later issued a revised “indigenous peoples” policy in 1994, following
criticism of the 1981 policy; yet despite progress, the updated approach
was also criticized, and, in the late 1990s, the bank looked again at
indigenous concerns.153 This time the bank drew, in part, on the input of
indigenous advocates. The result, Operational Policy (OP) 4.10, issued in
2005, was cautiously welcomed by indigenous advocates such as the
Indian Law Resource Center (ILRC) as a “significant advance” over
earlier bank efforts.154 Despite concern over “serious shortcomings,” ILRC
approved of prior informed consultation requirements in OP 4.10, and

148. Id.
149. See, e.g., 2007 U.N. Declaration, supra note 4 art. 25 (speaking in terms of a “spiritual
relationship” and “responsibilities to future generations”).
150. CBD, supra note 146, ¶ 8(j).
151. Id. ¶ 17(2).
152. Andrew Gray, Development Policy, Development Protest: The World Bank, Indigenous
Peoples, and NGOs, in THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND
GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 267, 269–70 (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998); see also
Kay Treakle, NACLA Report on the Americas, The World Bank’s Indigenous Policy (Apr. 18, 1996),
available at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/25/022.html; Indian L. Resource Ctr., The World
Bank’s Indigenous Peoples’ Policy: Successes and Setbacks (Oct. 2005) (on file with author)
[hereinafter ILRC White Paper].
153. On criticism of updated policy, see Gray, supra note 152; Treakle, supra note 152. On the
review process, see Summary of Consultations with External Stakeholders regarding the World Bank
Draft Indigenous Peoples Policy, World Bank White Paper, Apr. 18, 2002 (on file with author).
154. ILRC White Paper, supra note 152.
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noted that “unlike the 1991 policy, OP 4.10 recognizes some of the special
concerns raised by conservation areas and extractive industries.”155
The new policy recognizes the distinctive connection of indigenous
peoples to the land, providing:
The Bank recognizes that the identities and cultures of Indigenous
Peoples are inextricably linked to the lands on which they live and
the natural resources on which they depend. These distinct
circumstances expose Indigenous Peoples to different types of risks
and levels of impacts from development projects, including loss of
identity, culture, and customary livelihoods, as well as exposure to
disease.156
OP 4.10 recognizes that “Indigenous Peoples are closely tied to land,
forests, water, wildlife, and other natural resources, and therefore special
considerations apply if the project affects such ties.”157 In these cases,
planning documents must “pay particular attention to” the “customary
rights of the Indigenous Peoples, both individual and collective, pertaining
to lands or territories that they traditionally owned, or customarily used or
occupied, and where access to natural resources is vital to the
sustainability of their cultures and livelihoods.”158 Special considerations
also include “the cultural and spiritual values that the Indigenous Peoples
attribute to such lands and resources”159 as well as “Indigenous Peoples’
natural resources management practices and the long-term sustainability of
such practices.”160
OP 4.10 also requires an action plan for legal recognition of traditional
ownership, occupation, or usage for projects involving land titling and
acquisition—calling for “full legal recognition of existing customary land
tenure systems of Indigenous Peoples[,] or conversion of customary usage
rights to communal and/or individual ownership rights.”161 If neither
option is possible under domestic law, the plan should include “measures
for legal recognition of perpetual or long-term renewable custodial or use
rights.”162

155.
156.
(2005).
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Policies: Indigenous Peoples, OP 4.10, ¶ 2
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 16(a).
Id. ¶ 16(c).
Id. ¶ 16(d).
Id. ¶ 17.
Id.
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Where a bank project involves commercial development of natural
resources on indigenous lands, OP 4.10 calls for “a free, prior, and
informed consultation process,” which includes information on the
“potential effects of such development on the Indigenous Peoples’
livelihoods, environments, and use of such resources.”163 Project
proponents must also provide information on “the potential effects of such
development on Indigenous Peoples’ livelihoods, environments, and use
of such resources,” where a project involves “the commercial development
of Indigenous Peoples’ cultural resources and knowledge (for example,
pharmacological or artistic).”164
OP 4.10 recognizes that the “physical relocation of Indigenous Peoples
is particularly complex and may have significant adverse impacts on their
identity, culture, and customary livelihoods”165 and thus discourages
relocation except “in exceptional circumstances,” requiring borrowers “to
explore alternative project designs to avoid physical relocation of
Indigenous Peoples.”166 Where relocation is unavoidable, OP 4.10 requires
borrowers to seek “broad support for it from the affected Indigenous
Peoples’ communities as part of the free, prior, and informed consultation
process.”167 It also requires a resettlement plan “compatible with the
Indigenous Peoples’ cultural preferences, and includes a land-based
resettlement strategy.”168
While the World Bank has been widely criticized for the effect of its
lending policies169 (particularly those that affect the environment and the

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., FIFTY YEARS IS ENOUGH: THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BANK AND THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Kevin Danaher ed., 1994). Two leading examples of
organizations that work through networks formed in large part to monitor and challenge World Bank
lending practices are the Bank Information Center (BIC), whose web site at www.bicusa.org includes
press releases, white papers, and links documenting dozens of challenges to World Bank practices by
dozens of organizations, and 50 Years is Enough, whose web site at www.50years.org includes a
similar record of concern over World Bank Practices. See, e.g., Radhika Sarin et al., Earthworks,
Tarnished Gold: Mining and the Unmet Promise of Development (Sept. 2006), available at
http://www.bicusa.org/en/Page.Publications.aspx (last visited June 10, 2008); Bank Information Center
et al., How the World Bank’s Energy Framework Sells the Climate and Poor People Short, (Sept.
2006), available at http://www.bicusa.org/en/Page.Publications.aspx (last visited June 10, 2008); Press
Release, Gender Action, 50 Years Is Enough & CEE Bankwatch, IMF and World Bank Policies
Promote Violence Against Women, (Mar. 7, 2007), available at http://www.50years.org/cms/updates/
story/381 (last visited June 10, 2008). World Bank has established an internal review mechanism, the
World Bank Inspection Panel, which receives complaints about lending practices and allegations that
the bank has failed to follow its own internal practices. The Inspection Panel’s web site, hosted at
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rights of indigenous peoples170), OP 4.10 can be seen as a positive step, at
least in its formal recognition of the relationship between indigenous
peoples and the environment—a relationship tied to indigenous identity
and culture as well as economic livelihood. The Operational Policy
followed the findings of a senior sociologist in the Bank’s Environment
Department by more than a decade. These findings were published in 1993
as a World Bank discussion paper entitled Indigenous Views of Land and
the Environment, which calls for attention to the unique connection of
indigenous communities to the environment.171 OP 4.10 can be seen as an
important, though belated, recognition of this connection. At least the bank
is a step ahead of many other economic development institutions with a
profound influence on public development policy that have not made this
link.172 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), for example, does not even mention indigenous peoples in its
“Guidance” document on “Strategies for Sustainable Development.”173
F. Indigenous Peoples’ Voices
The distinctive connection of indigenous peoples to the land has social,
cultural, and spiritual dimensions that have not always translated well into
law—even human rights law, despite its explicit regard for social and
cultural concerns. This inevitable loss in translation found expression, in
part, in the ignorance that characterized colonial era legal claims about

www.worldbank.org, documents multiple complaints by multiple different actors.
170. See, e.g., BRUCE RICH, MORTGAGING THE EARTH: THE WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPOVERISHMENT, AND THE CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT 283–93 (1994); Ian A. Bowles & Cyril F.
Kormos, Environmental Reform at the World Bank: The Role of the U.S. Congress, 35 VA. J. INT’L L.
777, 786–88 (1995); Andrew Gray, Development Policy-Development Protest: The World Bank,
Indigenous Peoples and NGOs, in THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS,
NGOS AND THE WORLD BANK (Jonathan Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1996); Bank Information
Center, Rebuked by Internal Investigation, World Bank Plans to do More in DRC Forest Sector, but
Will it do Better? (Jan. 16, 2008), available at http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.3645.aspx (concerning
the bank’s failure to take account of forest sector financing on forest Pygmies in the Democratic
Republic of Congo). Compare David B. Hunter, Civil Society Networks and the Development of
Environmental Standards at International Financial Institutions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 437 (2008)
(describing evolving and improving environmental standards at World Bank in response to criticism).
171. WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPER 188, INDIGENOUS VIEWS OF LAND AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (Shelton Davis ed., 1993).
172. For a detailed discussion of OP 4.10 and the bank’s underlying obligations to recognize
indigenous rights, see Fergus MacKay, Universal Rights or a Universe Unto Itself? Indigenous
Peoples’ Human Rights and the World Bank's Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples,
17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 527 (2002).
173. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Strategies for Sustainable
Development: Guidance for Development Co-operation (2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/34/10/2669958.pdf.
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how indigenous peoples were using (or not using) the land.174
Justifications based on ideas such as terra nullius, or the bias against
cultures that failed to cultivate, so evident in opinions such as M’Intosh—
even the willingness to morally and theoretically ratify treaties by which
vast lands were “sold” by indigenous peoples to colonial powers—spring
in part from sociocultural and spiritual differences that made indigenous
perspectives on the land difficult for colonial cultures to understand
(although one cannot discount the influence of avarice and acquisitiveness
even where hints of cultural awareness were present).
Without yielding to the conceit that a full understanding of these
cultural and spiritual differences in a universal legal framework is
possible, and recognizing that modern expressions of indigenous beliefs,
including beliefs about a distinctive connection to the land, are filtered
through the legacy of colonial conquest and the exigencies of international
legal discourse, it is nevertheless important to ask how the connection is
described in indigenous terms by indigenous peoples. An effort has thus
been made in preparing this Article to gather indigenous expressions of
land, natural resource, and environmental connectedness through public
sources (such as statements and publications of indigenous groups and
advocates) and through academic literature (principally from anthropology
and sociology).175
The author collected more than fifty statements of indigenous groups or
advocates, mostly available from public sources, which speak of and about
indigenous connectedness to the land, resources, and environment.176
Despite the caveats inherent in relying on such a collection—and
recognizing that they are a very small publicly available sample of voices
from a highly diverse groups of people numbering over 200 million—they
affirm, in sum, the trend in legal instruments and institutions toward
recognizing a distinctive connection. The land as sometimes described as
an economic provider (a “pantry,” according to “the NI ‘aka’ pamux
people”177), which is understandable enough in western legal terms, and

174. See discussion supra Part II.B.
175. This methodology is highly constraining and in many ways problematic, but it is not
presented as an empirical data set, or even a sampling of authentic or representative voices. Instead, it
is a picture of the claims made publicly (or in some cases to interviewers) by indigenous peoples
(individuals, groups, and organizations) and indigenous advocates. In the context of this Article, it is
thought that the limitations and biases inherent in such an approach are outweighed by the advantage
of seeing at least some of the claims made by indigenous peoples regarding the land in their own
voices.
176. The author gratefully acknowledges research assistance in this endeavor from Mellisa
Benitez-Cotera and Maria E. Brockmann Rojas.
177. Marcus Colchester, Beyond “Participation”: Indigenous Peoples, Biological Diversity
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also as mother (the Huitchol;178 the Wayuu;179 the Cree180), as sacred (the
Suquamish;181 the Mapuche;182 the U’wa;183 the Quechua184), and as an
object of adoration (the Sami).185
The vast majority of statements collected—over ninety-five percent—
refer to a value that can be characterized as “spiritual.” They refer to the
spiritual value of some geographic feature (such as a mountain, lake, or
stream) and the spiritual value of a specific species (such as a type of tree,
bird, or fish). Examples include the Quechua in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru
(“Divinity . . . in nature is represented by the mountain,”)186 and the
Chobar and Lalitpur of Nepal (the “Gangaji has power . . . water and sand
from this river is required while performing a weekly religious ritual [and]
annual rites for the dead.”).187 For the Maori of New Zealand, “the land is

Conservation and Protected Area Management, 47 UNASYLVA, No. 186 (1996) (quoting Ruby Dustan
from Stein Valley, Alberta, Canada).
178. Guillermo De la Pena, Social Citizenship, Ethnic Minority Demands, Human Rights and
Neoliberal Paradoxes: A Case Study in Western Mexico, in MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA:
INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, DIVERSITY AND DEMOCRACY 129 (Rachel Sieder ed., 2002) (quoting Mauricio,
a Huitchol Elder).
179. Bjorn Sletto, Mapping the Gran Sabana, AMERICAS MAGAZINE, NOV. 2005, at 6, 13 (quoting
Noeli Pocaterra, President of the Commission for Indigenous People and Vice-President of the
National Assembly).
180. Danny Beaton, Healing and Protecting Our Sacred Mother Earth, FIRST NATIONS DRUM,
Summer 2002, available at http://www.firstnationsdrum.com/Sum2002/CovHealingProtecting.htm
(quoting Annie Mouse).
181. The First Nations Environmental Network, http://www.fnen.org/?q=node/35 (last visited
Mar. 3, 2008) (quoting Chief Seattle); see also Henry A. Smith, Chief Seattle’s 1854 Oration,
SEATTLE SUNDAY STAR, Oct. 29, 1887, available at www.halcyon.com/arborhts/chiefsea.html;
ALBERT FURTWANGLER, ANSWERING CHIEF SEATTLE 12–17 (1997). Seattle was of both Suquamish
(paternal) and Duwamish (maternal) descent. Id. at 144. See also CARL WALDMAN, ATLAS OF THE
NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN 157 (2000).
182. ANA MARIELLA BACIGALUPO, SHAMANS OF THE FOYE TREE; GENDER, POWER AND
HEALING AMONG CHILEAN MAPUCHE 48–49 (2007).
183. Larry Mosqueda, The Struggle of the Indigenous U’wa People against Oil Exploitation and
for Life: Green Action in Columbia, SYNTHESIS/REGENERATION, Winter 2002, available at
http://www.greens.org/s-r/27/27-26.html; see also Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Hybrid State—
Corporate Enterprise and Violations of Indigenous Land Rights: Theorizing Corporate Responsibility
and Accountability Under International Law, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 135, 136 (2007).
184. Shanna Langdon, Peru’s Yanacocha Gold Mine: The IFC’s Midas Touch?, CIEL, Sept.
2000, available at http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/ifccaseperu.html; see also GARCILASO DE LA VEGA, ROYAL
COMMENTARIES OF THE INCAS AND GENERAL HISTORY OF PERU 32 (Harold Livermore, trans., 1966).
185. Elizabeth Ann Svec, Metaphor and Metaphysics within Sami Culture, http://www.
utexas.edu/courses/sami/dieda/anthro/meta.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2008); see also Emily Barclay,
The Sámi Traditional World View through Decline and Ascent, http://www.utexas.edu/courses/sami/
dieda/anthro/worldview.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
186. Evaristo Pfuture Consa, La Cosmovisión Andina, http://www.quechuanetwork.org/sami.cfm?
yanantin=yachay1&lang=s (translation by author) (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
187. Maili Karmacharya, Everyone Placed the World’s Burden on Gangaji: Gangaji Did Not
Speak, Was Not Able to Say, “Don’t”, in WATER WISDOM: ORAL TESTIMONIES FROM NEPAL (Kunda
Dixit & Dibya Subba eds., 2000).
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the person, the person is the land.”188 For the Kuna of Panama: “gold lives
in [the heart]”;189 the Gikuyu of Kenya: “trees, such as the mugumo, [are]
sacred.”190 The Zapotec of Meso-America see corn as part of the
“fundamental autonomy,” and a legacy to their children,191 and for peoples
of the Solomon Islands, “God lives on the trees . . . . [If you want to take
medicine] you have to go and ask the tree first.”192
The idea of living in harmony with nature is frequently expressed. The
Caribbean Taino (who Las Casas reported bore the brunt of the initial
Spanish conquest), the Guarani in South America (whose habitat has long
preserved them from European influence) and the Ojibwas of the western
United States were all among those associated with a desire for
harmony.193 Finally, the idea that natural elements (living or nonliving)
themselves have spiritual qualities (roughly an animistic idea) was the
most common of expressions. For the Wanniya-laeto of Sri Lanka, people
coexist with the “creatures of the forest who share a complex moral
universe of fellow visible and invisible beings in an environment where
everything is alive.”194 The Dineh Navajo of the United States view
mining coal as taking the “liver” of the earth.195 For the Korekore of

188. TE AHUKARAMU CHARLES ROYAL, INDIGENOUS WORLDVIEWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 27
(Te Wananga-o-Rawkawa 2002), available at http://www.mkta.co.nz/assets/sabbaticalreport31.1.
2002.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
189. Kuna Cacique, Statement at the Workshop on Modernization of Panama’s Mining Code (Oct.
2003) (notes on file with author).
190. Bosire Maragia, The Indigenous Sustainability Paradox and the Quest for Sustainability in
Post-Colonial Societies: Is Indigenous Knowledge All That is Needed?, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
197, 217 (2006).
191. Carmelo Ruiz Marrero, Biodiversity in Danger: The Genetic Contamination of Mexican
Maize, AMERICAS PROGRAM: INTERHEMISPHERIC RESOURCE CENTER, June 2004, available at
http://www.americaspolicy.org/articles/2004/0406contam.html (quoting Aldo Gonzales, Zapotec
leader); see also John Ross, Tales of Corn Wars: NAFTA Scientists Meet Representatives of
Indigenous Groups Who Defend Their Corn, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER, Apr. 16, 2004,
available at http://www.encyclopedia.com/printable.aspx?id=1G1:116076212.
192. Ruth Lilongula, Statement, in VOICES OF THE EARTH: CULTURAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUES OF
BIODIVERSITY (Darren Addison Posey ed., 2000), available at http://www.unep.org/OurPlanet/
imgversn/105/voices.html.
193. With respect to the Taino, see Ivan F. Mendez-Bonilla, Taino Art, CUNY ONLINE NEWS,
available
at
http://www.lehman.cuny.edu/vpadvance/artgallery/gallery/taino_treasures/mendez_
essay_a.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2008); with respect to the Guarani, see Las Comunidades Guaranies
Radicadas en la Provincia de Misiones, available at http://www.cataratasdeliguazu.net/cultura_
guarani.htm; with respect to the Ojibwa, see WUB-E-KE-NIEW, WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXIST: A
TRANSLATION OF ABORIGINAL INDIGENOUS THOUGHT 198–99 (1995), available at http://fore.
research.yale.edu/religion/indigenous/texts/index.html (excerpt).
194. Wiveka Stegeborn, Sri Lanka: Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination—A Case Study of
the Wanniya-laeto, in ASPIRING TO BE: THE TRIBAL/INDIGENOUS CONDITION 316, 317 (B.K. Roy
Burman & B.G. Verghese eds., 1998).
195. International Indian Treaty Council, Submission to Commission on Human Rights, 59th
Sess. (Mar. 17–Apr. 25, 2003) (quoting Kee Watchman), available at http://www.treatycouncil.org/
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Zimbabwe, “[b]efore we touch the land we go to the spirits. The spirits are
linked to certain animals or trees.”196
While there is no one way to classify the distinctive connection of
indigenous people to the land and the environment, these examples
provide a sense, at least, of the range of views. An indigenous
“declaration” to the 2002 World Water Forum in Kyoto sought to
summarize an indigenous position on water as a resource:
We . . . reaffirm our relationship to Mother Earth and responsibility
to future generations to raise our voices in solidarity to speak for the
protection of water. We were placed in a sacred manner on this
earth, each in our own sacred and traditional lands and territories to
care for all of creation and to care for water. . . . Our relationship
with our lands, territories and water is the fundamental physical
cultural and spiritual basis for our existence. 197
This declaration asserts a right of indigenous self-determination,
including “the practice of our cultural and spiritual relationships with
water, and the exercise of authority to govern, use, manage, regulate,
recover, conserve, enhance and renew our water sources, without
interference.”198 It also reaffirms that the relationship encompasses both
land and natural resources, and the environmental impact of human
activity on both.
IV. APPLYING A DISTINCTIVE CONNECTION IN TRIBUNALS
While the distinctive connection claim asserted in human rights and
environmental instruments has been echoed by tribunals, it is more often
cited than applied in a way that one might call distinctive. Tribunals have
acknowledged the unique connection between indigenous communities
and the environment and admit that this connection gives rise to specific
rights; however, an examination of cases suggests that they turn more
often on the recognition of rights that do not rely on this connection.

section_21181212.htm.
196. Ralph Mogati, Statement, in VOICES OF THE EARTH, supra note 192.
197. Third World Water Forum, Kyoto, Japan, March 2003, Indigenous Peoples Kyoto Water
Declaration ¶ 1, available at http://www.indigenouswater.org/user/IPKyotoWaterDeclarationFINAL.
pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
198. Id. ¶ 11.
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A. Awas Tingni
One of the most prominent assertions of indigenous environmental
rights was a 2001 decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
in The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua.199 The
case involved Nicaragua’s decision in 1996 to grant a thirty-year, 62,000hectare timber concession to a subsidiary of a Korean company in an area
overlapping Mayagna communal lands in one of the eastern autonomous
regions of the country.200 The Mayagna community claimed that
Nicaragua’s failure to demarcate their communal lands and decision to
grant the concession without the community’s consent violated property
rights guaranteed by Article 21 of the American Convention on Human
Rights.201 The court agreed, finding that the community’s usufructuary
property rights under the statute governing Nicaragua’s Atlantic regions
should have been respected despite the fact that communal lands had not
been titled.202
In reaching its conclusion, the court detailed testimony about the Awas
Tingni connection to the land. Anthropologist Theodore MacDonald
testified:
The hills located in the territory of the Community are very
important. The “spirits of the mountain,” jefes del monte, which in
Mayagna are called “Asangpas Muigeni”, live in them, and it is they
who control the animals throughout that region. . . . There is then a
strong tie with the surroundings, with those sacred places, with the
spirits that live within, and the brothers who are members of the
Community. . . . To go hunting is, to a certain point, a spiritual act,
and it has much to do with the territory with [sic] they utilize. 203
Anthropologist and sociologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen204 testified more
generally:

199. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001).
200. Id. ¶ 2, 6. The Autonomous Atlantic Region of the North (RAAN) and South (RAAS)
comprise roughly the eastern third of the territory of Nicaragua along the Atlantic (eastern) side
(though they are technically located on the Caribbean Sea) and are governed by special provisions of
the Nicaraguan Constitution. Id. ¶ 12, 17.
201. Id. ¶ 25 (citing the American Convention on Human Rights).
202. Id. ¶ 153.
203. Id. ¶ 83(c) (emphasis added).
204. Dr. Stavenhagen is Professor of Anthropology at the Colegio de México. He served as the
first U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples. Rodolfo Stavenhagen,
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[T]he relationship between indigenous peoples and the land is an
essential tie which provides and maintains the cultural identity of
those peoples. One must understand that the land is not a mere
instrument of agricultural production, but part of a geographic and
social, symbolic and religious space, with which the history and
current dynamics of those peoples are linked.205
The court credited this testimony and acknowledged the connection
between indigenous communities and the environment, finding that “the
close ties of indigenous people with the land must be recognized and
understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life,
their integrity, and their economic survival.”206
Yet the case was pleaded and fundamentally decided as a collective
property rights claim—despite the spiritual significance of the land to the
Mayagna community.207 The fundamental problem in Awas Tingni was the
failure of the state to demarcate indigenous lands and the exploitation of
this ambiguous status to grant concessions without consultation. Had title
been granted (as the community had a right to expect under Nicaragua’s
Constitution208), the control of their lands and exclusion of trespassers
would have been an issue of basic property law. Even where the state
retains residual resource rights, the exercise of an easement to access the
resources (in this case, timber) is again a standard property law problem.
The special connection of the Mayagna community to the land helped the
court affirm a right of demarcation, and it emphasized the potential
injuries to the community from unchecked logging activities, but the
deeper implications of the Awas Tingni’s distinctive connection to the
land and environment did not come into play. The potential injuries and
trespass were corporeal; and while the fact of the Awas Tingni connection
to the land helped give the community a basis to challenge the injuries, the
unique nature of the connection was not critical to this result. Even the
failure to consult can be seen to have violated rights and interests that are
not unique to indigenous peoples and do not depend upon a special
connection to the land.

Resumen Curricular, available at http://www.colmex.mx/centros/ces/CV-Stavenhagen.htm (last
visited June 6, 2008).
205. Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 83(d).
206. Id. ¶ 149.
207. See generally Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
208. Constitution of Nicaragua, Arts. 89, 180; see also Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
¶¶ 117–18.

2008]

BEYOND INDIGENOUS PROPERTY RIGHTS

91

B. Belize Maya
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights faced the issue of
development encroaching on traditional territories in a petition filed
against the Belize government in 1998 by the ILRC and the Toledo Maya
Cultural Council on behalf of the Mopan and Ke’kchi Maya of southern
Belize (Belize Maya). The petition claimed the state had violated the
American Declaration by granting logging and oil concessions to
traditional Maya lands and “otherwise failing to adequately protect those
lands.”209 The state’s failure to recognize and secure Maya territorial
rights, it alleged, had “impacted negatively on the natural environment
upon which the Maya people depend for subsistence, have jeopardized the
Maya people and their culture, and threaten to cause further damage in the
future.”210
The Belize Maya held land collectively according to a traditional
tenure system which existed alongside “a system of ‘reservations’
established by the British colonial administration” that had continued
following independence in 1981,211 though the petition claimed that
“customary land tenure patterns of the Maya communities extend well
beyond the reservation boundaries.”212 Petitioners also asserted, and the
Commission accepted, that petitioners were “descendents or relatives of
Maya subgroups that have inhabited the territory at least as far back as the
time of European exploration . . . .”213
The Commission noted that “indigenous peoples enjoy a particular
relationship with the lands and resources traditionally occupied and used
by them . . . [as] integral components of [their] physical and cultural
survival.”214 It also held that “for indigenous communities, relations to the
land . . . [have] a material and spiritual element which they must fully
enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future
generations.”215

209. Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/11.122, doc. 5 rev. ¶ 2 (2004).
210. Id. ¶ 2.
211. Id. ¶ 25. Belize had been a British colony since the mid-nineteenth century. See P.A.B.
THOMSON, BELIZE A CONCISE HISTORY (2004).
212. Maya Indigenous Community, 12.053 Inter-Am. C.H.R. ¶ 25.
213. Id. ¶ 92. The Commission found this claim of “long-standing ancestral connections”
supported by “evidence from authorities who have studied the origins and history of the Mayaspeaking people of the Toledo District” as well as admissions on the government’s official website. Id.
¶¶ 92–93.
214. Id. ¶ 114.
215. Id.
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The Commission quoted the Inter-American Court’s holding in Awas
Tingni regarding the “close ties of indigenous people with the land,”216
emphasizing that indigenous property rights are not limited to “those
property interests that are already recognized by states or that are defined
by domestic law,” but instead have “autonomous meaning in international
human rights law.”217 This includes “that indigenous communal property
that arises from and is grounded in indigenous custom and tradition” and
requires “special measures to ensure recognition of the particular and
collective interest that indigenous people have in the occupation and use of
their traditional lands and resources.”218
The Commission concluded that the Mopan and Ke’kchi Maya people
had “demonstrated a communal property right,” and the state’s failure to
demarcate, title, and protect their territory violated Article XXIII of the
American Declaration.219 The logging and oil concessions had been
granted without prior consultation220 and had “caused environmental
damage.”221 The Commission concluded these failures not only violated
Belize Maya property rights, but also amounted to racial discrimination222
and thus violated Maya equal protection rights under Article II of the
American Declaration.”223 Again, as in Awas Tingni, the unique
relationship to the land was important to the Commission and affirmed its
conclusions that the Belize Maya’s collective rights had been violated. But
again, the decision extended only to claims of demarcation, title, and prior
consultation—basic property rights available to nonindigenous peoples as
well.
C. Yanomami
In late 1980, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
considered a petition against Brazil alleging violations of Yanomami
indigenous people’s rights resulting from the construction of a highway
through their traditional territory which had been built to facilitate access
to mineral deposits discovered in the 1970s.224 The influx of “highway

216. Id. ¶ 116.
217. Id. ¶ 117.
218. Id.
219. Id. ¶ 135.
220. Id. ¶ 143.
221. Id. ¶¶ 147–48.
222. Id. ¶¶ 167–71.
223. Id. ¶ 171.
224. Yanomami Community v. Brazil, Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. No. 12/85, Background
¶ 2(f) (1984–1985). The Commission noted that “[b]etween 10,000 and 12,000 Yanomami Indians live
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construction workers, geologists, mining prospectors, and farm
workers”225 was predictably negative for the Yanomami. “The massive
penetration of outsiders,” the petition alleged, “had devastating physical
and psychological consequences for the Indians; it has caused the break-up
of their age-old social organization; it has introduced prostitution among
the women, something that was unknown; and it has resulted in many
deaths, caused by epidemics of influenza, tuberculosis, measles, venereal
diseases, and others.”226
As a consequence, the Yanomami abandoned much of their territory
and retreated further into the Amazon. The government responded with
agricultural development projects and a proposed “Yanomami Indian
Park” (which would have protected virtually all traditional lands).227 But
the agricultural projects simply accelerated the loss of land and initiated a
forced removal of Yanomami to agricultural communities where they
could not practice their customs and traditions.228 The park project was
halted by opposition from interests seeking to open the area to further
development.229
The Commission took note of Brazilian constitutional and statutory
guarantees of indigenous rights,230 and concluded that “the failure of the
Government of Brazil to take timely and effective measures in behalf of
the Yanomami Indians” resulted in the violation of their rights under the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 231 While the state
had retained subsurface mineral rights under the constitution,232 access to
minerals on indigenous lands was limited to “cases of great national
interest, by federal public entities,” and had to be approved by the
administrative agency established to protect indigenous interests,
Fundaçäo Nacional do Indio (FUNAI).233 The Commission found that

in the State of Amazonas and the Territory of Roraima, on the Brazilian border with Venezuela.” Id.
Background ¶ 2(a).
225. Id. Considerations ¶ 10(a).
226. Id. Background ¶ 3(a).
227. Id. Background ¶ 2(j).
228. Id. Background ¶ 3(c).
229. Id. Background ¶ 3(f).
230. See id. Background ¶ 2(b) (citing CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] amend. 1/69, art. 198); id.
Background ¶ 2(c) (quoting Estatuto do Indio, No. 6000, de la de dezembro de 1973 (Braz.) art. 23).
231. See id. Resolves ¶ 1.
232. C.F. art. 168 (Braz.).
233. Indigenous peoples are considered “relatively incompetent” and thus under the
“guardianship” of FUNAI under article 6 of the Brazilian Civil Code. FUNAI was created under the
Ministry of Interior “for the defense, protection, and preservation of the interest and cultural heritage
of the Indians and also to promote programs and projects related to their social and economic
development.” Yanomami, 7615 Inter-Am. C.H.R. Background ¶ 2(e).
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FUNAI had failed to exercise its fiduciary obligations.234 The Commission
found violations of the right to life, liberty, and personal security;
residence and movement; and preservation of health and well-being,235
finding the displacement had “all the negative consequences for their
culture, traditions, and costumes.”236 The Commission did not, however,
find a violation of Yanomami property rights, though it had been pleaded
and it was clear that encroachment on traditional lands was at the heart of
the injury to the Yanomami communities.237 The Commission also did not
make specific reference to a distinctive connection to the land, but did note
“that for historical reasons and because of moral and humanitarian
principles, special protection for indigenous populations constitutes a
sacred commitment of the states.”238 The Commission also noted that the
Organization of American States (OAS) had made “the preservation and
strengthening of the cultural heritage” of ethnic groups and threats to their
“cultural identity” a priority.239 Thus, while the 1982 decision did not
specifically use the language that has since emerged regarding a distinctive
connection—indeed, it did not rest its decision on property rights
allegations—there is a sense that the unique cultural relationship of the
Yanomami to their land is, in part, driving the Commission’s result. Yet
the Commission did nothing to suggest that unique relationship created
rights beyond those afforded by national law.
D. Lubicon Lake Band
In 1984, the U.N. Human Rights Committee received a communication
from the Lubicon Lake Band (the Band), a Cree Indian band in Alberta,
Canada, alleging that governmental decisions to allow development on
their lands violated the Band’s right of self-determination for economic,
social and cultural development, and the right not to be deprived of its
own means of subsistence under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).240 The Band is “a self-identified, relatively
autonomous, socio-cultural and economic group” whose “members have

234. Id.
235. Id. Resolution ¶ 1.
236. Id. Considerations ¶ 2.
237. This may be because the Commission found that the government was already taking relevant
steps to address property rights concerns through the Yanomami Park proposal. Id. Considerations
¶ 12.
238. Id. Considerations ¶ 8.
239. Id. Considerations ¶ 9.
240. Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, U.N. Human Rights Committee [H.R.C.], Commc’n No.
167/1984, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (1990).
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continuously inhabited, hunted, trapped and fished in a large area
encompassing approximately 10,000 square kilometers in northern Alberta
since time immemorial.”241 It alleged that development activities
threatened “the destruction of [its] environmental and economic base” and
“would make it impossible for the Band to survive as a people for many
more years.”242 The Band’s “existence,” it asserted, was “seriously
threatened by the oil and gas development that has been allowed to
proceed unchecked on their traditional hunting grounds and in complete
disregard for the human community inhabiting the area.”243 Though the
Band’s initial communication concerned the environmental and cultural
impact of oil and gas exploration, a later submission alleged Canada had
leased “all but 25.4 square miles of the Band's traditional lands for
development, in conjunction with a pulp mill . . . .”244 The claim alleged
Canada had violated the antidiscrimination provisions of ICCPR Article
2(1), failing to take into consideration “elements of a social, economic and
property nature inherent in the Band's indigenous community structure.”245
Although Canada claimed that domestic judicial remedies had not been
exhausted, the Band contended that even a successful permanent
injunction “would come too late” to “bring back the animals,” “restore the
environment,” or undo destruction of Band members’ “traditional way of
life” or damages to their “spiritual and cultural ties to the land.”246 Canada
also initially objected that “the Lubicon Lake Band is not a people within
the meaning of [A]rticle 1 of the Covenant,”247 and that the

241. Id. ¶ 2.2.
242. Id. ¶ 3.2.
243. Id. ¶ 12(a).
244. Id. ¶ 18.1
245. Id. ¶ 16.1. In addition to the Article 2 violations, the Band alleged violations of the Article 6
right to life, claiming the government’s actions had
created a situation which “led, indirectly if not directly, to the deaths of 21 persons and [is]
threatening the lives of virtually every other member of the Lubicon community. Moreover,
the ability of the community to [survive] is in serious doubt as the number of miscarriages
and stillbirths has skyrocketed and the number of abnormal births . . . has gone from near zero
to near 100 per cent.”
Id. ¶ 16.2 (alteration in original).
246. Id. ¶ 11.2.
247. Id. ¶ 6.1. The Lubicon Lake Band later complained that Canada had “fabricate[d]” a
“Woodland Cree Band,” to assert a “competing claim to traditional Lubicon lands . . . in further
violation of [A]rticles 1, 26 and 27 of the Covenant.” Id. ¶ 27.5. The Lubicon Lake Band alleged that
the “Woodland Cree” was
a group of disparate individuals drawn together by Canada from a dozen different
communities scattered across Alberta and British Columbia, who have no history as an
organized aboriginal society and no relation as a group to the traditional territory of the
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communication was made by an individual seeking to assert a collective
right,248 but later conceded “that the Lubicon Lake Band has suffered a
historical inequity and that they are entitled to a reserve and related
entitlements.”249
The Human Rights Committee concluded that both “[h]istorical
inequities . . . and certain more recent developments threaten the way of
life and culture of the Lubicon Lake Band, and constitute a violation of
[A]rticle 27 so long as they continue.”250 It found, however, that the
government’s offer of a territorial reserve and other accommodations
would, if accepted, enable the Band to “maintain its culture, control its
way of life and achieve economic self-sufficiency,”251 and that this was a
sufficient remedy “within the meaning of [A]rticle 2 of the Covenant.”252
A separate opinion by Nisuke Ando conceded “[i]t is not impossible
that a certain culture is closely linked to a particular way of life and that
industrial exploration of natural resources may affect the Band’s
traditional way of life, including hunting and fishing,” but objected to the
idea that “the right to enjoy one’s own culture should not be understood to
imply that the Band’s traditional way of life must be preserved intact at all
costs.” 253 Though Ando was concerned about the scope of cultural
protection available, he obliquely articulated a connection between
indigenous culture and the impact of development in a way that the
Committee had not, by emphasizing the close link of certain cultures to a
“particular way of life” connected to the environment. While the
Committee found merely that the facts of the instant case manifested a
violation of cultural rights,254 Ando’s challenge asks rather directly how
one balances development interests within a dominant culture with the
competing interests of indigenous peoples to defend their own way of life
within that dominant culture.

Lubicon Lake Band [in an effort to] . . . undermine the traditional Lubicon society and to
subvert Lubicon land rights.
Id. (alteration in original).
248. Id. ¶ 6.1. The government of Canada pointed out that the Lubicon Lake Band “comprises
only one of 582 Indian bands in Canada and a small portion of a larger group of Cree Indians residing
in northern Alberta. It is therefore the position of the Government of Canada that the Lubicon Lake
Indians are not a ‘people.’” Id. ¶ 6.2.
249. Id. ¶ 24.1.
250. Id. ¶ 33.
251. Id. ¶ 24.1; see also id. ¶ 17.1.
252. Id. ¶ 24.1.
253. Id. app. I (original emphasis omitted).
254. In fact, the Committee seemed to be applying a fact-dependent test in assessing a possible
Article 27 violation. See id. ¶ 13.4.
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E. Ilmari Länsman
In 1992, Ilmari Länsman and other reindeer breeders of Sami ethnic
origin, all members of the Muotkatunturi Herdsmen's Committee
(Herdsmen), complained to the U.N. Human Rights Committee that a
contract by Finland’s Central Forestry Board to allow stone quarrying on
the side of a mountain they considered sacred, and transportation of the
stone directly through a “complex system of reindeer fences” and along a
road through territory traditionally claimed by the Herdsmen, violated
their rights under Article 27 of the ICCPR.255 While title to traditional
Sami lands was disputed by Finland, there was no dispute that the
activities would affect lands traditionally used by the Herdsmen. They
asserted that the quarry site “is a sacred place of the old Sami religion,”256
and allowing quarrying and transporting, they alleged, would violate “their
right to enjoy their own culture, which has traditionally been and remains
essentially based on reindeer husbandry.”257
Finland responded that national authorization had followed a locallygranted permit from the Angeli Municipal Board, and maintained that the
Herdsmen and others in their community had been adequately
consulted.258 The extent of environmental damage from the quarrying and
transportation was also disputed.259 Finland conceded that “the concept of
culture in the sense of [A]rticle 27 provides for a certain protection of the
traditional means of livelihood for national minorities and can be deemed
to cover livelihood and related conditions insofar as they are essential for
the culture and necessary for its survival.”260 It also acknowledged “the
concept ‘culture’ in [A]rticle 27 covers reindeer herding as an ‘essential
component of the Sami culture’.”261 The state maintained, however, that
planned quarrying activities would affect only a very limited part of the

255. Länsman v. Finland, U.N.H.R.C., Commc’n No. 511/1992, ¶ 2.3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994).
256. Id.
257. Id. ¶ 3.1. The Herdsmen also cited in support of their claim ILO No. 169 “concerning the
rights of indigenous and tribal people in independent countries.” Id. ¶ 3.2.
258. Id. ¶ 4.1. The state also raised procedural objections.
259. The Committee considered, for example, allegations that even “the marks and scars left by
the provisional road allegedly will remain in the landscape for hundreds of years, because of extreme
climatic conditions.” Id. ¶ 5.3. The state countered that “possible harm to the environment remains
minor,” and that “special attention was paid . . . to avoid disturbing reindeer husbandry . . . .” Id. ¶ 7.7.
260. Id. ¶ 7.10.
261. Id. ¶ 7.3
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land (about 2.5 acres) and thus would have “no significance on the bearing
capacity of the pastures” of the Herdsmen.262
Finland argued that reindeer husbandry is protected under national law
and that local officials paid “special attention” in granting their permit “to
avoid disturbing reindeer husbandry in the area.”263 It also noted that the
state’s contract, issued pursuant to the local permit, required
environmental mitigation measures,264 and that the contract both assigned
liability to the contractor for any significant environmental “or other”
damage caused by quarrying activities and could be cancelled if
“extraction of land resources has had unpredictable harmful environmental
effects.”265 In addition to these protections, Finland asserted that the
impact of the quarrying activities would not threaten “the survival and
continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity” of the
Sami, which is the central concern of Article 27.266 The Herdsmen, it
argued, could “continue to practise reindeer husbandry and are not forced
to abandon their lifestyle.”267
After weighing these competing claims, the Human Rights Committee
found it undisputed that the Herdsmen are a minority under Article 27
with a right to enjoy their own culture,268 and that “reindeer husbandry is
an essential element of their culture.”269 The Committee also found that
the mountain “continues to have a spiritual significance relevant to [Sami]
culture” and noted the Herdsmen’s concern “that the quality of slaughtered
reindeer could be adversely affected by a disturbed environment.”270 The
Committee nevertheless found no breach of Article 27 because it held that
the impact of quarrying had been minimal and that the Herdsmen had been
sufficiently consulted in the permitting and contracting processes
conducted by local and national authorities.271

262. Id. ¶ 7.6. The state suggested that the nature of the quarrying procedure would be only
minimally disruptive and provided an opinion of the Environmental Office of the Lapland County
Administrative Board that “only low pressure explosives are used to extract stone from the rock:
‘Extraction is carried out my means of sawing and wedging techniques . . . to keep the rock as whole
as possible.’” Id. ¶ 7.7.
263. Id. ¶ 7.7
264. Id. ¶ 7.5.
265. Id. ¶ 7.3.
266. Id. ¶ 7.12.
267. Id. ¶ 7.13.
268. Id. ¶ 9.2.
269. Id.
270. Id. ¶ 9.3.
271. Id. ¶ 9.6.
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Significantly, the Committee rejected Finland’s claim of a “margin of
appreciation”272 where cultural rights are at issue under Article 27,273
relying instead on its findings that the scope of activity had been
sufficiently disruptive to Sami culture and that the Herdsmen were
afforded an opportunity to participate in the process.274 It nevertheless
cautioned that future development must “be carried out in a way that the
authors continue to benefit from reindeer husbandry” and noted that a
significant expansion of mining activities in the Angeli area “may
constitute a violation of the authors’ rights under [A]rticle 27, in particular
of their right to enjoy their own culture.”275
Here, as in the Inter-American cases, we see the tribunal reciting
claims of a special connection and still essentially falling back on
traditional property claims—in this case, more in the nature of nuisance—
and a right to prior consultation. The Committee had an opportunity to
find that the unique nature of the Sami’s relationship to the mountain and
its herding practices called for special scrutiny or raised the prospect of a
unique injury, but failed to do so.
V. A DISTINCTIVE CONNECTION DOCTRINE—BEYOND PROPERTY
It is perhaps ironic that the nature of indigenous peoples’ relationship
to the land—once used to deny sovereignty and to mask conquest as
“discovery” in cases such as M’Intosh276—has, under the human rights
regime, become a justification for protecting remaining descendents of the
peoples dispossessed. The irony is compounded by the growing claim in
recent anthropological literature that many indigenous peoples historically
had far more complex relationships with the land as cultivators, engineers,
and botanists than even sympathetic twentieth-century advocates may have
imagined. The work of Professors William Balée, Darrell Posey, R. Brian
Ferguson, and Leslie Sponsel, among others in the emerging field of
historical ecology, challenges the idea of ecologically naïve or
unsophisticated “pre-encounter” indigenous communities.277 What one

272. Id. ¶ 9.4.
273. Id.
274. Id. ¶ 9.5 (citing General Comment on Article 27 of the ICCPR (1994) ¶ 7); id. ¶ 9.6.
275. Id. ¶ 9.8.
276. Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
277. See generally ADVANCES IN HISTORICAL ECOLOGY (William Balée ed., 1998) and works
produced therein: R. Brian Ferguson, Whatever Happened to the Stone Age? Steel Tools and
Yanomami Historical Ecology, in HISTORICAL ECOLOGY, supra, at 287; Darrell A. Posey, Diachronic
Ecotones and Anthropogenic Landscapes in Amazonia: Contesting the Consciousness of Conservation,
in HISTORICAL ECOLOGY, supra, at 104; Leslie E. Sponsel, The Historical Ecology of Thailand:
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legal scholar terms a tendency to “live lightly on the land,”278 is
understood by these social science scholars who study past and present
indigenous settlement and land use patterns as resulting from a complex
interaction of culture, cosmology, and choice practiced for generations (as
the M’Intosh Court might put it, “from time immemorial”279). While these
scholars acknowledge ambiguities and do not claim to have a full
understanding of the field, the evidence they have uncovered (often
literally unearthed) certainly does not support a claim of terra nullius or
domicilium vacuum.
But we are left with nation-states constructed on these ideas—or, as
Professor Thornberry reminds us, constructed more often on assertions of
right growing from conquest or from treaties written in the languages of
those who harbored such ideas.280 The conceit of spiritual, moral, cultural,
and technological superiority begat sovereign assertions—first in the
countryside, and later the courtrooms—that lay at the foundation of many
of the states which today frame and implement the international legal
system. Yet that system seems willing to hand some measure of right back
to the descendents of the dispossessed.281
Some of the claims made in this process of what one might call
“retrocession”—that indigenous peoples have a distinctive connection to
the land—thus appear ironic in light of the historical context against which
the legal protections of indigenous land rights are now being framed.282
This argues for special attention to the claim of a distinctive connection

Increasing Thresholds of Human Environmental Impact from Prehistory to the Present, in
HISTORICAL ECOLOGY, supra, at 376; see also RONALD NIEZEN, THE ORIGINS OF INDIGENISM:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY (2003).
278. Peter Manus, Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Environment-Based Cultures: The
Emerging Voice of Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 553, 555 (2005). This
thesis should not be confused with what some in the anthropological literature have criticized as a
tendency to see indigenous peoples as “ecologically noble savages.” See, e.g., Allyn MacLean
Stearman, Revisiting the Myth of the Ecologically Noble Savage in Amazonia: Implications for
Indigenous Land Rights, 49 CULTURE & AGRICULTURE 2, 2–6 (1994).
279. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 30–33.
280. THORNBERRY, supra note 24.
281. See generally Adriana Fabra, Indigenous Peoples, Environmental Degradation, and Human
Rights: A Case Study, in HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 245 (Alan
Boyle & Michael Anderson eds., 1996); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL
THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1996); Darlene M. Johnston, Native Rights as Collective Rights: A
Question of Group Self-Preservation, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 179 (Will Kymlicka
ed., 2006). This willingness, however, remains tenuous. Witness the objections of states which
benefited from conquest and discovery doctrines to the terms of the 2007 U.N. Declaration, supra note
8.
282. The irony is that indigenous peoples’ unique relationship to the land was historically used to
justify dispossession (see, for example, M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 543 and Mabo v. Queensland II (1992)
175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.)) and now it is being used to justify the recognition of land rights.
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and particularly to a need to understand the connection in terms set out by
indigenous peoples themselves, lest the international legal system find
itself making yet another set of presumptions about distant or alien
cultures that peoples and nation states come to regret in another 500 years.
There is a danger of engaging in what anthropologists might call
“essentializing” the relationship indigenous cultures have to the land for
the sake of classifying and managing it doctrinally, and this danger should
also be borne in mind.283
This is an argument for care in the further development and application
of a distinctive connection doctrine, not an argument for rejecting it. The
instruments and indigenous claims cited above affirm that there is
something socially, culturally, and spiritually unique about how many
indigenous communities understand and use their traditional lands. The
acknowledgement of that relationship by institutions and tribunals has had
a discernable impact on how tribunals decide indigenous land claims by
providing a rationale for collective rights, for recognizing tenure where
uses are not intensive or exploitive, and for giving indigenous
communities a voice in development decision making.
The first important impact has been that the land connectedness of
indigenous peoples has helped validate the assertion of collective property
rights on behalf of indigenous communities. The ability to define
boundaries, to live and make use of resources within those boundaries, and
to exclude trespassers is a fundamental characteristic of property law. This

283. As used by anthropologists, the term has been defined as characterizing representations that
“freez[e] and reify[] an identity in a way that hides the historical processes and politics within which it
develops.” Jean E. Jackson & Kay B. Warren, Indigenous Movements in Latin America, 1992–2004:
Controversies, Ironies, New Directions, 34 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 549, 559 (2005). This presents
problems for social scientists, because it can reduce intragroup diversity to idealized, homogenized
images which confer political power (and thus, perhaps, legal rights) only so long as Indians’ political
identities resonate with Western ideas and symbols. Beth A. Conklin & Laura R. Graham, The Shifting
Middle Ground: Amazonian Indians and Eco-Politics, 97 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 4, 695, 706 (1995);
see also J. Peter Brosius, Analyses and Interventions: Anthropological Engagements with
Environmentalism, 40 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 3 (1999). The danger of this phenomenon in law can
be seen in the understanding of indigenous land relationships which helped justify the results in cases
such as M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 543, and Mabo II, 175 C.L.R. 1. Even where the essential characteristics
are seen as positive and policy results are benign or constructive there remains a danger of viewing an
authentic identity as limited or static. See, e.g., Alcida Rita Ramos, Cutting Through State and Class:
Sources and Strategies of Self-Representation in Latin America, in INDIGENEOUS MOVEMENTS, SELFREPRESENTATION, AND THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA 251 (Kay B. Warren & Jean E. Jackson eds.,
2002). Though a more positive understanding of indigenous land relationships is evident in the
evolving recognition of a distinctive connection, this understanding should neither be used to negate
the complex relationship of indigenous peoples with the land nor be constructed in a way that could
limit, rather than confer, indigenous land and resource rights.
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ability has been upheld for communities in cases such as Awas Tingni,284
Yanomami,285 and Lubicon Lake Band286 based at least in part on the
tribunals’ recognition of the special connection that these communities had
to the land. Though not held in fee simple or under another title
recognized in common law or civil law systems, the results were the same.
Despite the lack of sovereignty, these communities were seen to have a
property claim beyond the mere possessory rights once recognized in
M’Intosh.287
The distinctive connection has also promoted respect for collective
tenure in terms of a community’s historical and cultural appropriate use.
At one time, for example, theorists and courts would have rejected the idea
that a group of 150 people living in a small collection of dwellings and
hunting or gathering in an area covering 20,000 acres could claim any kind
of right to the entire area. Even discounting ideas such as terra nullius,
more persistent and time honored legal doctrines such as best use and
adverse possession could undermine any such claim. Yet a respect for a
distinctive indigenous connection provides a meaningful counterweight to
these longstanding doctrines. Put simply, this is how the land is used by
some indigenous peoples; the lack of fencing, grazing, cultivation, paper
titles, or specific vigilance against trespass are deprived of legal
consequence, or at least diminished in their effect. The Inter-American
Commission held as much in Belize Maya.288 Respect for collective tenure,
moreover, as an element of how an indigenous group owns or “holds” its
land, minimizes intrusion into the community’s decisions about resource
use and allocation and assures a generational continuity that might
otherwise be undermined.
Respect for a distinctive connection has also grounded the assertion of
a right to participate in development decisions and in the benefits of
development that occur on or influence indigenous lands. Even where
indigenous communities lack an exclusive right to natural resources on the
lands they have traditionally used, a respect for their unique relationship
has provided a basis for requiring that they be consulted and participate
meaningfully in development choices that may affect their interests. The

284. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni, Community v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001).
285. Yanomami Community v. Brazil, Case 7615 Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. No. 12/85 (1984–85).
286. Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, U.N.H.R.C., Commc’n No. 167/1984, U.N. Doc. A/45/40
(1990).
287. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 543.
288. Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053 Inter-Am.
C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser. L/V/U.122, doc. 5 rev. 2 (2004).
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result in Awas Tingni, for example, rested in large part on the fact that the
government had failed to consult the community about an activity
(logging) that would have an impact on the spiritual and cultural values it
places on the land.289 Similarly, in Ilmari Länsman, though the U.N.
Human Rights Committee rejected Sami Herdsmen opposition to
quarrying activity on their traditional lands, it did so largely on the basis
that community members had been consulted and the activity had been
approved first at a local level in a town recognized as being largely of
Sami origin.290 The Committee also noted that any further mining activity
would require continuing consultation and would need to be carried out in
a way that respected the Herdsmen’s traditional reliance on reindeer
husbandry.291 The Committee expressed a similar concern in Lubicon Lake
Band for resource development (in that case, oil and gas) to be conducted
in a way that assured the ability of the Band to maintain its culture and
way of life.292
While the recognition of a distinctive connection should not be seen as
the lone basis for the result in any of these cases, it certainly gave weight
to the tribunals’ decisions and helped shape outcomes that responded to
each indigenous community’s unique circumstances and interests. These
cases, and the range of instruments also discussed, can be seen as
advancing a distinctive connection doctrine that has helped relate the
nonphysical relationship of indigenous peoples to the land (with strong
spiritual and cultural dimensions) to the very corporeal understandings of
land rights as they have evolved through common law and civil law
property regimes.
Yet the underlying foundations of the doctrine imply much more than a
mere translation of these deeper cultural values to the language of Western
property law. Claims of a distinctive connection—especially when viewed
in the terms offered by indigenous peoples and their advocates—cannot be
easily cabined within the constraints of property or even natural resources
law.293 There is a dynamic aspect to indigenous land references that speaks
more about ecological integrity than merely physical integrity. The manner

289. Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 79.
290. Länsman v. Finland, U.N.H.R.C., Commc’n No. 511/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/
1952 (1994).
291. Id. ¶ 9.8.
292. Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, U.N.H.R.C., Commc’n No. 167/1984, U.N. Doc. A/45/40
(1990).
293. This is not to say that traditional property and natural resources doctrine cannot address some
indigenous concerns relating to land and the environment. But traditional doctrine has distinct and
demonstrable limitations.
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of land and natural resource (even landscape) dependence—its integration
as a spiritual as well as physical provider—cannot count on doctrines of
title and trespass alone for vindication. The references to harmony with
nature so common in the indigenous expression of a land connectedness294
do not appear to be an artifact of popular Western discourse, but rather a
dominant historical theme in indigenous land relationships.295
What does this say, then, about the distinctive connection doctrine?
While it has served to substantiate collective indigenous land rights,
tenurial relationships, and participatory rights, there are other legal
theories and doctrines not reliant upon a unique relationship that can
accomplish the same ends.296 More importantly, the distinctive connection
is not by its terms limited to a physical claim. There is a sense that the
doctrine, by bringing a focus to what is unique about indigenous land
claims in the spiritual and cultural sense, could do more.
A. Cultural and Spiritual Standing—Moiwana Village
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights gave a hint at what a
nonphysical land-related claim might look like in Moiwana Village v.
Suriname.297 In that case, descendants of escaped African slaves who
claimed a degree of autonomy over the lands their ancestors had occupied
since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries298 could not return to their
village because the violent deaths of women, children and the elderly there
during Suriname’s civil war left them fearful and concerned over the
spirits of the victims.299 Though not asking to be seen as indigenous, the

294. See discussion supra Part III.F.
295. See supra note 276.
296. Property rights are universally affirmed in human rights instruments, see e.g., Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 2, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc
A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), as are rights of participation, id. art. 27; the affirmation of collective rights
does not depend on a cultural or spiritual tie to land. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, arts. 1–2, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
(the right of “all peoples” to self determination and to “freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources” is not limited to those with unique ties to the land).
297. 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124 (June 15, 2005).
298. Moiwana Village was part of a larger community of the N’djuka Maroon peoples of
Suriname. They are descendants of slaves who escaped to rainforest areas in the eastern part of
Suriname’s present national territory in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that had signed
treaties with the state in 1760 and 1837 that established semi-autonomous regions with settled
boundaries. Id. ¶ 86(1)-(4). “Although individual members of indigenous and tribal communities are
considered natural persons by Suriname’s Constitution, the State’s legal framework does not recognize
such communities as legal entities. . . . [N]ational legislation does not provide for collective property
rights.” Id. ¶ 86(5).
299. Id. ¶ 86(43).
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villagers have analogous claims to their own language, history, as well as
cultural and religious traditions. The Court found that “a N’djuka
community’s connection to its traditional land is of vital spiritual, cultural
and material importance,”300 and credited expert testimony that, like
indigenous communities, the N’djuka have an “all-encompassing
relationship to their ancestral lands. They are inextricably tied to these
lands.”301 The court also recounted testimony that the N’djuka’s “inability
to maintain their relationships with their ancestral lands and its sacred sites
has deprived them of a fundamental aspect of their identity and sense of
well being.”302 The court concluded that the state’s failure to investigate
the deaths in the village had perpetuated the dislocation of villagers,303
citing their testimony that “only when justice is accomplished in the case
will they be able to appease the angry spirits of their deceased family
members, purify their land, and return to permanent residence without
apprehension of further hostilities.”304
The court ordered Suriname to investigate the villagers’ deaths; to
recover their remains and facilitate proper burial; to “carry out a public
ceremony” recognizing its responsibility; to issue an apology; and, to build
a “memorial in a suitable public location.”305
In Moiwana Village, then, there is recognition of a unique relationship
to ancestral lands substantiating rights and warranting relief that certainly
exceeds the rights that might be recognized and relief that might be
granted under common law and civil law property regimes. By extension,
the injury to resources, species, and landscapes held sacred by indigenous
peoples might be seen as similarly cognizable under a distinctive
connection doctrine offering more culturally relevant protection to the land
interests of indigenous peoples. Just as the N’djuka’s relationship to their
land compelled the Inter-American Court to fashion relief appropriate to
the nature of the relationship, the distinctive connection of indigenous
peoples to their traditional lands should be protected where relevant,
beyond rights of demarcation, title, and participation.

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id. ¶ 101.
Id. ¶ 132.
Id.
Id. ¶ 134.
Id. ¶ 86(43).
Id. ¶ 233.
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B. Ecology as Culture
The application of a distinctive connection doctrine should include at a
minimum some recognition that impacts on species or ecosystems
important to indigenous peoples be measured (or at least comprehended)
and minimized. The protection of biodiversity in this sense is not always
limited to the policing of trespass on demarcated lands. It may include, for
example, the protection of migratory species upon which indigenous
peoples depend or the protection of habitat or landscapes central to
indigenous culture or custom. It would certainly extend to activities with a
transboundary impact, such as pollutant transport.306 It might also include
giving indigenous communities standing to sue in cases where they are
uniquely affected by a nuisance or another incident, the impact of which
has cultural or spiritual implications.
C. Recent Cases in Point—Unheralded Cultural Claims
If environment (in its broadest sense, to include ecosystems, species,
and landscapes) were fully appreciated as part of indigenous culture, then
indigenous claims could be understood to extend beyond basic property
rights such as title and excluding trespass. This would give indigenous
communities standing to seek redress for environmental impacts that
encroach upon cultural or spiritual interests without a physical trespass.307
For example, following the grounding of the Exxon Valdez off the coast of
Alaska in 1989, Inuit communities were denied standing by the U.S.
courts because the injury to their “subsistence way of life” was not deemed
a compensable injury.308 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
“the right to obtain and share wild food, enjoy uncontaminated nature, and
cultivate traditional, cultural, spiritual and psychological benefits in
pristine natural surroundings is shared by all Alaskans.”309 Application of
a distinctive connection doctrine might have led to a different result. It
would certainly oblige the court to address how Inuit traditions, and their

306. See, e.g., Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1935).
307. This idea may sound relatively esoteric until one considers the example of regulatory takings
jurisprudence in the U.S., which recognizes and compensates for the expropriation of economic, but
non-physical property interests. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). While some might argue that economic interests differ from
social and cultural concerns, international human rights law places the three in the same class.
308. Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 1996).
309. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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cultural and spiritual connection to the land, might be seen as distinct from
the relationship of others.310
A more recent case before the U.N. Committee for the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (CERD) also raises questions for which a distinctive
connection doctrine could provide guidance. The case involves a
longstanding dispute over the U.S. government’s efforts to evict two
Western Shoshone sisters, Carrie and Mary Dann, from rangeland that is
part of a much larger area encompassing tens of millions of acres in
western states which the Danns claimed their ancestors had used “from
time immemorial.”311 The United States asserted that aboriginal title to all
Shoshone lands, including the disputed area, had long ago been
“extinguished” through “gradual encroachment.”312
When the Inter-American Commission reviewed the case, it
acknowledged, as it had before, “a particular connection between
communities of indigenous peoples and the lands and resources that they
have traditionally occupied and used,”313 and found that the United States
had failed to ensure the Danns’ right to property “under conditions of
equality.”314 The United States essentially ignored the Commission Report
and acted instead to evict the Dann sisters from the disputed rangeland,315
so they sought the intervention of the CERD.316 In addition to addressing
the Dann sisters’ property rights claims, the CERD expressed specific
concern over proposed surface mining near the Danns’ ranch and a
proposed nuclear waste repository approximately two hundred miles south
of the ranch (on traditional Western Shoshone lands).317 Though the
United States responded to the CERD’s concerns over the underlying
property rights issues, it did not take up the questions about mining and

310. See also Günther Handl, Indigenous Peoples’ Subsistence Lifestyle as an Environmental
Valuation Problem, ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW:
PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION AND VALUATION 85 (Michael Bowman & Alan Boyle eds., 2002).
311. United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 43 (1985).
312. United States v. Dann, 706 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, Dann, 470 U.S.
39.
313. Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11,140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02
¶ 125, 128 (2002) (citing The Human Rights Situation of the Indigenous People in the Americas, InterAm. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.108, doc. 62 21–25 (2000)).
314. Dann, 11.140 Inter-Am. C.H.R. No. 75/02 ¶ 172.
315. Id. ¶ 179; see also Amnesty Int’l USA, Report on Western Shoshone (2003), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/justearth/indigenous_people/western_shoshone.html (last visited Aug. 31,
2007).
316. U.N. Comm. for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD], Early Warning and
Urgent Action Procedure Decision 1(68), GE.06-41251 [hereinafter CERD Early Action Letter].
317. Id. ¶ 7(b).
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nuclear waste.318 These issues certainly raise broader environmental
concerns that might affect the cultural and spiritual rights of the Dann
sisters as well as other Western Shoshone, and it may be an area where a
distinctive connection doctrine could be employed.
A distinctive connection doctrine might also provide a useful point of
analysis in the more recent claim by the Circumpolar Inuit Conference
regarding the impact of U.S. energy and climate policy on their ability to
sustain, among other things, a traditional lifestyle. The case was filed in
December 2005 with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
which decided the following year not to proceed with the matter.319 The
Commission issued no formal decision in the case, and expressed concern
to the petitioners that it would be difficult to establish a causal link
between U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and climate change as well as
concern that the Commission has no jurisdiction over the many states
contributing to the climate problem.320
While the Inuit petition alleges that U.S. climate policy may constitute
a wide range of human rights violations, and makes reference to Inuit
“close ties to the land and the environment,”321 it does not develop the
argument of a distinctive connection or address its implications for the
impact of climate change on the Inuit. To the extent that the claim can be
cast as a defense of Inuit cultural rights to property, shelter, and a broader
range of economic, cultural, and spiritual interests, it may be easier to find
that the United States has an obligation to work toward the progressive
realization of Inuit rights through long-term policy decisions,322 rather than
finding that its contribution to greenhouse gases is distinguishable from a
range of other factors and parties over whom the Commission has no
jurisdiction. The nature of the Inuit relationship to land itself might give
the petitioners’ standing to claim relief that others who are differently
affected by climate change cannot seek. Certainly, their injury is distinct

318. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT TO THE UN COMMITTEE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION, annex II (Aug. 31, 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/cerd_report/
83406.htm.
319. Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights
Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the
United States (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.earthjustice.org/library/legal_docs/petition-tothe-inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-on-behalf-of-the-inuit-circumpolar-conference.pdf
[hereinafter Inuit Petition]; June George, 1CC Climate Change Petition Rejected, Nunatsiaq News
(Dec. 15, 2006), available at http://www.nunatsiaq.com/archives/61215/news/nunavut/61215_02.html
(last visited June 6, 2008).
320. Interview by author with participants in public hearing, March 2006.
321. Inuit Petition, supra note 319, at 72.
322. See, e.g., South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001(1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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and disproportionate—not just because of where they live, but how they
live. If their distinctive connection were clearly recognized as a cultural or
spiritual right, the Commission might be persuaded, as the South African
Constitutional Court in Grootboom, to find the state should work
progressively toward a culturally-appropriate solution, regardless of
myriad other factors that may be affecting the right.
These examples simply raise possible applications of a distinctive
connection doctrine if it is seen as something more than merely a basis for
sustaining core property rights. The language used by instruments,
advocates, and tribunals would seem to provide a basis for these
applications, if the connection is appreciated for what it is—a unique
cultural and spiritual relationship to land and the environment.
VI. CONCLUSION
A distinctive connection doctrine can be plainly seen emerging from
the human rights framework for the protection of indigenous peoples. It
has helped justify the assertion of collective property rights by indigenous
communities, led to greater respect for tenurial relationships common
among indigenous communities, and secured a right to participate in
decision making relating to indigenous lands. Yet the emergence of this
doctrine both calls for caution and offers promise.
The caution is a concern that indigenous property and environmental
rights may be seen to depend on the distinctive connection of indigenous
peoples to the land rather than the assertion of basic and universal rights to
which indigenous peoples are entitled regardless of their land
connectedness. It is not necessarily harmful to recognize a distinctive
connection while relying on traditional property and antidiscrimination
doctrine, and it seems clear that the unique connection of indigenous
peoples to land and the environment has helped secure those traditional
rights which were historically denied. But the doctrines should not be
conflated, and tribunals should clarify that indigenous land rights are
fundamentally based on universal principles and universally applicable
legal principles.
The promise is that the distinctive connection might be more
effectively deployed where unique attributes of indigenous peoples are
particularly relevant to address ecological harms and assert environmental
rights. Where traditions and beliefs of indigenous communities make them
particularly vulnerable to the environmental consequences of
governmental policy and development, the doctrine might serve to
overcome the hesitance of tribunals to consider indigenous assertions of
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right and offer standing to indigenous communities to challenge injuries
that affect their unique connection to the land, resources, and
environment.323
Thus, while the distinctive connection doctrine has helped to advance
indigenous rights of title, tenure, and participation, it may also offer a
means of addressing environmental impacts bound up with indigenous
communities’ relationship to the land and environment. This would give
rise to a property right beyond title and the exclusion of a trespasser—one
that protects the deeper ecological values which appear to be inherent in
this distinctive connection.

323. It may be fair to ask not only how this doctrine might give voice to unasserted indigenous
environmental claims, but also what implications it may have for peoples and communities not seen as
indigenous. While this article documents repeated assertions of a unique land connection on behalf of
indigenous peoples (indeed, for many this has become a discourse about identity), it invites the
question of whether a distinctive connection analysis could be made for other communities with
deeply rooted relationships to the land or natural resources. This is not to diminish the understanding
apparently reached by the international community—that indigenous peoples have such a
relationship—but merely to ask whether this understanding might be extended to those who are
demonstrably similarly situated. Certainly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights did not hesitate
to recognize the spiritual connection of inhabitants of Moiwana Village though they were descendants
of escaped slaves and not earlier arrivals. Even the Awas Tingni court set aside allegations that the
claimants in that case were relatively recent arrivals (hundreds rather than thousands of years) to the
land they sought to defend. The question of a distinctive connection is one of substance, not label.
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to explore this broader theme, it may well warrant future
investigation.

